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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. For several years the Court has been carrying out a 
programme of audit inquiries on financial and technical 
cooperation with the Mediterranean countries, in par-
ticular by making on-the-spot visits to a number of 
countries which are receiving Community aid. 
In the course of this audit, the Court has taken account of 
the request made to the Court by the European Parliament, 
in its decision on the discharge for the implementation of 
the general budget for the financial year 1987 (
!), to assess 
financial and technical cooperation with the Mediter-
ranean countries, in view of the under-utilization of 
budgetary appropriations in this sector. 
1.2. By the end of 1990, the Council had reached an 
agreement on the general outline and the content of the 
policy of Community aid and cooperation in the context of 
the fourth series of Protocols to be concluded with the 
southern and eastern Mediterranean countries for the 
period 1992-1996. In addition to a substantial increase in 
the Community's financial commitment (
2), the scope of 
this policy has been enlarged to include support for 
economic reforms in these countries, the financing of 
regional projects and cooperation measures covering 
several countries, aid to private undertakings, cooperation 
with Community companies and also better access to the 
Community market for certain agricultural products from 
Mediterranean countries. When it comes to draw up and 
implement the new Protocols, it is important that the 
Community take fully into consideration the lessons learnt 
from the preceding Protocols and endeavour to rectify the 
shortcomings which have been uncovered. This report aims 
to assist in this process. 
1.3. This report deals with the implementation over a 
period of some ten years, from about 1979 to 1989, of 
financial and technical cooperation with the following ten 
countries: 
a) three Maghreb countries: Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia, hereinafter referred to as 'the Maghreb 
countries' (
3); 
(!) OJ No L 247, 23. 8. 1989, p. 7. 
(
2) Total financial aid from the Community under and in addition 
to the Protocols will amount to some 4 400 Mio ECU, of which 
1 300 Mio ECU will be financed from budgetary resources, 
whilst 3 100 Mio ECU will be funded by loans by the European 
Investment Bank from its own resources. 
(
3) Of the five Maghreb countries, Libya does not receive any 
Community aid and Mauritania, which is a signatory to the 
Lome Conventions, receives funds from the European 
Development Funds (EDF). 
b) four Mashreq countries: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Syria, hereinafter referred to as 'the Mashreq coun-
tries' (
4); 
c) Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. 
The total amount of aid made available to these countries 
during the period in question was 3 783,5 Mio ECU. Of 
that amount, 1 714,5 Mio ECU was financed from the 
general budget and 2 069 Mio ECU from the European 
Investment Bank's (EIB) own resources. Table 1 gives a 
detailed breakdown of this aid. (
5) 
1.4. This report relates only to operations involving 
budgetary resources; this includes sums disbursed by way 
of the global guarantee which the Community gives for 
loans made from the EIB's own resources. The actual 
operations which are financed from the EIB's own 
resources are excluded from this evaluation; that explains 
why this report does not deal with financial cooperation 
with Israel and Yugoslavia, which involves exclusively the 
latter form of financing (
6). Furthermore, financial cooper-
ation with those countries which have joined the Com-
munity (Spain, Greece and Portugal) is also not covered by 
this report. 
1.5. After an introduction, in the second Chapter of this 
report, to the general framework of financial and technical 
cooperation, Chapter 3 makes an assessment of the actual 
system of Financial Protocols; it analyses their merits and 
their weaknesses, by comparing them in particular with the 
provisions governing Community aid to countries in other 
parts of the world. In Chapter 4, the quality of the 
management systems set up by the Commission is 
examined; for this purpose, a separate analysis is made of 
the measures whose management is entrusted to the EIB 
and of those of which the Commission remains directly in 
charge. Chapter 5 presents an evaluation of the implemen-
tation and results of the Community aid, and Chapter 6 
contains a summary of the main conclusions of this report. 
(
4) Of the other Mashreq countries, Sudan, which is a signatory to 
the Lome Conventions, receives funds from the European 
Development Funds (EDF), whereas Iraq and the countries of 
the Arabian peninsula do not receive any Community aid. 
(
5) Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 do not include the budgetary effects of 
invoking the Community global guarantee for loans from EIB 
own resources mentioned in paragraph 5.11. 
(
6) In the case of these countries there is nevertheless a possibility 
that budgetary resources may be used through the operation of 
the Community guarantee for loans granted by the EIB. No C 252/4 Official Journal of the European Communities 26. 9. 91 
Table 1 — Community aid to Mediterranean non-member countries 
(Mio ECU) 
1 
Country 
or geographical 
TURKEY 
3rd Protocol 
Special aid 
Total 
CYPRUS 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
MALTA 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
NORTHERN 
MEDITERRANEAN 
ALGERIA 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
MOROCCO 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
TUNISIA 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
MAGHREB 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
EGYPT 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
JORDAN 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
LEBANON 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
SYRIA 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
Total 
3rd Protocol Reserve 
MASHREQ 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
SOUTHERN 
MEDITERRANEAN 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
MEDITERRANEAN 
2 
Period of application 
1979-31.10.1981 
1.07.1980-30.06.1982 
1.01.1979-31.12.1983 
1.05.1984-31.12.1988 
1.06.1990-31.12.1993 
1.11.1978-31.10.1983 
1.10.1986-31.10.1988 
1.08.1989-31.10.1993 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.01.1983-31.10.1986 
1.03.1988-31.10.1991 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.01.1983-31.10.1986 
1.11.1988-31.10.1991 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.06.1983-31.10.1986 
1.05.1988-31.10.1991 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.01.1983-31.10.1986 
1.08.1988-31.10.1991 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.01.1983-31.10.1986 
1.02.1988-31.10.1991 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.03.1983-31.10.1986 
1.03.1988-31.10.1991 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.02.1983-31.10.1986 
Earmarked for Syria 
3 
Loans 
from EIB 
own resources 
90,0 
0,0 
90,0 
20,0 
28,0 
44,0 
92,0 
16,0 
16,0 
23,0 
55,0 
237,0 
70,0 
107,0 
183,0 
360,0 
56,0 
90,0 
151,0 
297,0 
41,0 
78,0 
131,0 
250,0 
167,0 
275,0 
465,0 
907,0 
93,0 
150,0 
249,0 
492,0 
18,0 
37,0 
63,0 
118,0 
20,0 
34,0 
53,0 
107,0 
34,0 
64,0 
98,0 
110,0 
165,0 
285,0 
475,0 
925,0 
332,0 
560,0 
940,0 
1 832,0 
2 069,0 
4 
Grant 
aid 
0,0 
75,0 
75,0 
6,0 
10,0 
13,0 
29,0 
5,0 
10,5 
12,5 
28,0 
132,0 
25,0 
28,0 
52,0 
105,0 
16,0 
67,0 
162,0 
245,0 
15,0 
37,0 
87,0 
139,0 
56,0 
132,0 
301,0 
489,0 
63,0 
76,0 
189,0 
328,0 
18,0 
19,0 
35,0 
72,0 
8,0 
11,0 
19,0 
38,0 
19,0 
22,0 
41,0 
34,0 
108,0 
128,0 
277,0 
513,0 
164,0 
260,0 
578,0 
1 002,0 
1 134,0 
5 
Aid from budg 
Special 
loans 
220,0 
0,0 
220,0 
4,0 
6,0 
0,0 
10,0 
5,0 
3,0 
0,0 
8,0 
238,0 
19,0 
16,0 
0,0 
35,0 
58,0 
42,0 
0,0 
100,0 
39,0 
24,0 
0,0 
63,0 
116,0 
82,0 
0,0 
198,0 
14,0 
50,0 
0,0 
64,0 
4,0 
7,0 
0,0 
11,0 
2,0 
5,0 
0,0 
7,0 
7,0 
11,0 
18,0 
0,0 
27,0 
73,0 
0,0 
100,0 
143,0 
155,0 
0,0 
298,0 
536,0 
6 
etary resources 
Risk 
capital 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
5,0 
5,0 
0,0 
0,0 
2,5 
2,5 
7,5 
0,0 
0,0 
4,0 
4,0 
0,0 
0,0 
11,0 
11,0 
0,0 
0,0 
6,0 
6,0 
0,0 
0,0 
21,0 
21,0 
0,0 
0,0 
11,0 
11,0 
0,0 
0,0 
2,0 
2,0 
0,0 
0,0 
1,0 
1,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
2,0 
0,0 
0,0 
16,0 
16,0 
0,0 
0,0 
37,0 
37,0 
44,5 
7 
Total 
budgetary 
aid 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
10,0 
16,0 
18,0 
44,0 
10,0 
13,5 
15,0 
38,5 
377,5 
44,0 
44,0 
56,0 
144,0 
74,0 
109,0 
173,0 
356,0 
54,0 
61,0 
93,0 
208,0 
172,0 
214,0 
322,0 
708,0 
77,0 
126,0 
200,0 
403,0 
22,0 
26,0 
37,0 
85,0 
10,0 
16,0 
20,0 
46,0 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
36,0 
135,0 
201,0 
293,0 
629,0 
307,0 
415,0 
615,0 
1 337,0 
1 714,5 
8 
Total aid 
310,0 
75,0 
385,0 
30,0 
44,0 
62,0 
136,0 
26,0 
29,5 
38,0 
93,5 
614,5 
114,0 
151,0 
239,0 
504,0 
130,0 
199,0 
324,0 
653,0 
95,0 
139,0 
224,0 
458,0 
339,0 
489,0 
787,0 
1 615,0 
170,0 
276,0 
449,0 
895,0 
40,0 
63,0 
100,0 
203,0 
30,0 
50,0 
73,0 
153,0 
60,0 
97,0 
157,0 
146,0 
300,0 
486,0 
768,0 
1 554,0 
639,0 
975,0 
1 555,0 
3 169,0 
3 783,5 
The difference of 54 Mio ECU between the total overall budgetary amount shown in column 7 (1 714,5 Mio ECU) and the amounts shown in Tables 2 and 4 
(1 660,5 Mio ECU) is due to the fact that the latter do not include the Third Protocol with Cyprus (18 Mio ECU), which entered into force in 1990, or the reserve 
(36 Mio ECU) earmarked for the Third Protocol with Syria, which had not yet been signed as of 31.12.1989. 26. 9. 91  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 252/5 
2. THE FRAMEWORK OF FINANCIAL AND 
TECHNICAL COOPERATION 
2.1. Preferential relations with the Mediterranean coun-
tries began to be established in the Sixties, in the form of 
Association Agreements based mainly on trade relations. In 
1972 the Community started to introduce a policy based on 
an overall approach to the Mediterranean countries, in 
particular with the inclusion in the Agreements of a section 
devoted to financial and technical cooperation. Since 1976, 
Cooperation Agreements of unlimited duration have been 
signed with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries and with 
Malta and Cyprus. Relations with Turkey continue to be 
governed by the provisions of the 1963 Association 
Agreement. 
2.2. With each of the partner countries, financial and 
technical cooperation has been the subject of Protocols by 
which the Community undertakes to make available to the 
country concerned an overall amount of aid which is 
intended to help finance projects or measures that 
contribute to the social and economic development of the 
recipient country; these Protocols lay down, amongst other 
things, the duration of their application and the volume and 
forms and field of application of financial and technical 
cooperation; in addition, they contain some provisions on 
the appraisal and carrying-out of the projects which are 
being financed. The framework of cooperation with 
Mediterranean non-member countries is to a large extent 
based on the main principles of the EDF system: the aid is 
multiannual, it is administered jointly and there are several 
financing instruments. 
2.3. By the end of 1990, three series of Protocols had been 
signed (see Annex 1). As shown in Table 1, of the 
1 714,5 Mio ECU granted from budgetary resources, 
708 Mio ECU was for the Maghreb countries, 
629 Mio ECU for the Mashreq countries and 
377,5 Mio ECU for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. Graphs 1 
and 2 illustrate how the aid from budgetary resources is 
divided up between the geographical areas and recipient 
countries concerned. 
2.4. Annex 2 briefly describes the framework for finan-
cial and technical cooperation. It gives details of: 
a) the period of application of the Financial Protocols; 
b) the financing instruments covered by the Protocols; 
c) the general objectives of Community aid during the 
three series of Protocols and the fields of application of 
the latter; 
d) the budgetary basis; 
e) the implementing provisions for the Protocols and the 
dividing-up between the EIB and the Commission of 
the power to administer the aid; 
f) the procedures for deciding the financing and for 
drawing up the agreements and financing contracts; 
g) the administrative methods used by the Commission 
and the recipient States for implementing the Proto-
cols. 
3. THE SYSTEM OF PROTOCOLS 
Procedure for concluding the Protocols 
3.1. The whole process of negotiating and concluding the 
Protocols is relatively slow and is sometimes affected by 
factors that are not directly linked to financial and 
technical cooperation. 
3.2. Although they are based on Article 238 of the EEC 
Treaty, the First Protocols with the Maghreb and Mashreq 
countries and with Cyprus and Malta were nevertheless 
subject — unnecessarily — to ratification by the Member 
States. This delayed their entry into force by one and a half 
to two and a half years, depending on the case (see 
Annex 1). 
3.3. The Second Protocols with the Maghreb and 
Mashreq countries were signed nine months to one year 
after the expiry of the previous Protocols (31 Oc-
tober 1981) and did not come into force until 14 to 
19 months after their theoretical date of entry into force 
(1 November 1981). The delays were even longer in the 
case of the Second Protocol with Malta, the negotiations 
for which were impeded until 1985 by a number of Maltese 
legal constraints. The Protocol came into force in 
October 1986, i.e. virtually three years after the theoretical 
date (1 November 1983). 
3.4. The entry into force of the Third Protocols with the 
Maghreb and Mashreq countries was spread out over the 
whole of 1988 (see Annex 1), one and a half to two years 
after the expiry of the preceding Protocols (31 Oc-
tober 1986) .The fact that these negotiations proved to be 
particularly lengthy can be explained by the need to adapt 
the provisions of the agreements in the field of trade 
relations, following Spain and Portugal's entry into the 
Community; the subordination of financial and technical 
cooperation to factors which are not directly linked to it is 
particularly evident in the case of Morocco, where the 
preliminary to the negotiations concerned the conclusion of 
a new fisheries agreement. No C 252/6  Official Journal of the European Communities  26. 9. 91 
3.5. The Third Protocols with Cyprus and Malta were no 
exception in this respect and came into force 17 months 
and nine months respectively after the expiry of the 
preceding Protocols (see Annex 1). 
The consequences 
3.6. Except for the First Protocols with Cyprus and 
Malta, the period of application is not fixed in relation to 
their date of entry into force but in respect of an expiry date 
(see Annex 2, paragraph 2). Any delay affecting their entry 
into force therefore means a reduced period of application. 
In fact, the latter is in most cases less than four years, and is 
sometimes reduced to three years or even less (see 
Annex 1). 
3.7. These delays result, furthermore, in a break in the 
sequence of the Protocols. As already pointed out (see 
paragraphs 3.3 — 3.4), there are generally one to two years 
between the expiry of one Protocol and the entry into force 
of the succeeding one. For some countries, this means a 
break in the continuity of the cooperation. For countries 
such as Malta, Morocco or Tunisia, which arranged under 
the first two Protocols for the appropriations to be 
committed during the fixed period of application (see 
Tables 2 and 3), this means that the pattern of commit-
ments is broken; during the period separating two 
Protocols, financial and technical cooperation is thus 
confined to carrying out approved projects. 
Budgetary management 
Spreading-out of commitments 
3.8. According to the Protocols, the total amount of the 
individual sums that are to be committed each year should 
be spread as evenly as possible over the whole period of 
application; at the beginning of the period of application, 
commitments may nevertheless be made for proportionally 
higher amounts, within reasonable limits. 
3.9. In practice, this provision is rarely complied with. 
The implementation of the Protocols follows a pattern of 
its own, depending mainly on the ability of the partner 
countries to present for financing projects which can be 
implemented immediately. Table 2 and Graphs 4 to 18 
show in respect of several Protocols and several countries 
that financial years for which very considerable amounts of 
appropriations have been committed are followed by 
periods where commitments are very low, or even non-
existent. 
3.10. Moreover, this provision loses a considerable 
amount of its significance because of the reduction which 
has been observed in the period of application of the 
Protocols: the aid measures and, consequently, the 
appropriations relating to them, are thus concentrated. It 
also impedes speedy implementation of the Protocols in 
countries which are able from the outset to present projects 
that take up a proportionally much larger part of the 
overall amount of appropriations granted. 
3.11. Furthermore, the creation in 1987 of a single article 
(965) for all three Protocols with the Maghreb and 
Mashreq countries makes it much less necessary to ensure 
for each individual Protocol that the expenditure charged 
to the general budget is spread out. 
3.12. Consequently, this provision should not be in-
cluded in future Protocols. Instead, the Commission, 
together with the recipient countries, should rather bring 
its efforts to bear at the planning stage in order to draw up 
realistic plans for implementing financial and technical 
cooperation. Such planning cannot disregard budgetary 
constraints. 
Utilization of the balance 
3.13. The Protocols lay down that any funds not 
committed at the end of the implementing period 'shall be 
used, until exhausted'. This balance sometimes represents a 
considerable share of the overall budgets specified in the 
Protocols. This is the case in particular for the First and 
Second Protocols with Algeria and Egypt where it varies, 
according to case, by approximately 30 % to 50 % of the 
total sum earmarked (see Table 3). At the end of 1989, 
moreover, these Protocols had still not been closed. 
3.14. The Protocols may be implemented with a measure 
of flexibility, in order to allow for adjustment to new 
circumstances which could not reasonably be foreseen at 
the outset. Nevertheless, in the form in which it is 
formulated and applied, this provision authorizes a 
commitment of funds for an indefinite period and deprives 
the multiannual framework in which the Protocols are 
theoretically set of all meaning. 
3.15. The experience gained should be turned to account 
for future protocols. First of all, the budgetary amount 
allocated for financing under a particular protocol should 
be fixed by taking account of the actual chances of its being 
fully utilized during the implementing period. The 
utilization of any balance should form the subject of a well-
defined procedure resulting in a formal decision by the 26. 9. 91  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 252/7 
Table 2 — Changes in overall budgets, commitments and payments to 31.12.1989 
(Mio ECU) 
TURKEY 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
CYPRUS 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
MALTA 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
NORTHERN 
MEDITERRANEAN 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
ALGERIA 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
MOROCCO 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
3rd Protocol 
Spec, aid 
Total 
3rd Protocol 
Spec, aid 
Total 
3rd Protocol 
Spec, aid 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
Overall 
budgets 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
Overall 
budgets 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
Overall 
budgets 
10,0 
13,5 
15,0 
38,5 
Overall 
budgets 
359,5 
Overall 
budgets 
44,0 
44,0 
56,0 
144,0 
Overall 
budgets 
74,0 
109,0 
173,0 
356,0 
1979 
220,0 
220,0 
12,1 
12,1 
4,0 
4,0 
1979 
10,0 
10,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
1979 
10,0 
0,0 
10,0 
0,9 
0,0 
0,9 
0,4 
0,0 
0,4 
1979 
240,0 
13,0 
4,4 
1979 
44,0 
44,0 
0,4 
0,4 
0,0 
0,0 
1979 
74,0 
74,0 
2,0 
2,0 
0,1 
0,1 
1980 
220,0 
220,0 
18,1 
18,1 
4,2 
4,2 
1980 
10,0 
10,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
1980 
10,0 
0,0 
10,0 
1,8 
0,0 
1,8 
0,7 
0,0 
0,7 
1980 
240,0 
19,9 
4,8 
1980 
44,0 
44,0 
2,5 
2,5 
0,1 
0,1 
1980 
74,0 
74,0 
7,2 
7,2 
1,3 
1,3 
1981 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
220,0 
46,0 
266,0 
61,2 
0,0 
61,2 
1981 
10,0 
10,0 
1,5 
1,5 
1,5 
1,5 
1981 
10,0 
0,0 
10,0 
9,9 
0,0 
9,9 
5,7 
0,0 
5,7 
1981 
315,0 
277,3 
68,4 
1981 
44,0 
44,0 
29,4 
29,4 
2,1 
2,1 
1981 
74,0 
74,0 
74,0 
74,0 
25,3 
25,3 
1982 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
220,0 
46,0 
266,0 
76,0 
4,0 
80,1 
1982 
10,0 
10,0 
6,0 
6,0 
1,5 
1,5 
1982 
10,0 
0,0 
10,0 
10,0 
0,0 
10,0 
6,2 
0,0 
6,2 
1982 
315,0 
282,0 
87,7 
1982 
44,0 
44,0 
35,7 
35,7 
4,8 
4,8 
1982 
74,0 
74,0 
74,0 
74,0 
42,8 
42,8 
1983 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
220,0 
46,0 
266,0 
108,7 
13,4 
122,1 
1983 
10,0 
10,0 
10,0 
10,0 
2,4 
2,4 
1983 
10,0 
0,0 
10,0 
10,0 
0,0 
10,0 
7,4 
0,0 
7,4 
1983 
315,0 
286,0 
131,8 
1983 
44,0 
44,0 
88,0 
37,6 
0,0 
37,6 
7,4 
0,0 
7,4 
1983 
74,0 
109,0 
183,0 
74,0 
37,4 
111,4 
67,7 
23,4 
91,1 
1984 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
220,0 
46,0 
266,0 
137,7 
19,9 
157,7 
1984 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
10,0 
0,0 
10,0 
5,4 
0,0 
5,4 
1984 
10,0 
0,0 
10,0 
10,0 
0,0 
10,0 
8,8 
0,0 
8,8 
1984 
331,0 
286,0 
171,9 
1984 
44,0 
44,0 
88,0 
38,2 
6,4 
44,6 
11,3 
0,0 
11,3 
1984 
74,0 
109,0 
183,0 
74,0 
86,6 
160,6 
68,5 
35,0 
103,5 
1985 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
220,0 
46,0 
266,0 
153,5 
34,7 
188,3 
1985 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
10,0 
6,8 
16,8 
7,9 
0,6 
8,5 
1985 
10,0 
0,0 
10,0 
10,0 
0,0 
10,0 
9,2 
0,0 
9,2 
1985 
331,0 
292,8 
206,0 
1985 
44,0 
44,0 
88,0 
38,2 
18,1 
56,3 
18,1 
2,3 
20,3 
1985 
74,0 
109,0 
183,0 
74,0 
108,3 
182,2 
70,7 
72,9 
143,6 
1986 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
220,0 
46,0 
266,0 
200,7 
41,8 
242,5 
1986 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
10,0 
10,4 
20,4 
9,3 
1,1 
10,5 
1986 
10,0 
13,5 
0,0 
23,5 
10,0 
0,0 
0,0 
10,0 
10,0 
0,0 
0,0 
10,0 
1986 
344,5 
296,4 
263,0 
1986 
44,0 
44,0 
88,0 
38,5 
24,0 
62,5 
18,8 
4,4 
23,2 
1986 
74,0 
109,0 
183,0 
74,0 
108,3 
182,2 
71,5 
83,5 
155,0 
1987 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
220,0 
56,0 
276,0 
209,0 
45,8 
254,8 
1987 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
10,0 
10,4 
20,4 
9,9 
4,8 
14,7 
1987 
10,0 
13,5 
0,0 
23,5 
10,0 
3,0 
0,0 
13,0 
10,0 
0,0 
0,0 
10,0 
1987 
344,5 
309,4 
279,5 
1987 
44,0 
44,0 
88,0 
35,0 
42,2 
77,2 
21,6 
7,6 
29,2 
1987 
74,0 
109,0 
183,0 
74,0 
108,3 
182,2 
72,7 
90,2 
162,8 
1988 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
216,6 
46,3 
262,9 
1988 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
10,0 
10,4 
20,4 
9,9 
8,3 
18,2 
1988 
10,0 
13,5 
0,0 
23,5 
10,0 
13,5 
0,0 
23,5 
10,0 
0,0 
0,0 
10,0 
1988 
344,5 
338,9 
291,1 
1988 
44,0 
44,0 
56,0 
144,0 
38,1 
42,2 
0,6 
80,9 
22,1 
8,1 
0,0 
30,2 
1988 
74,0 
109,0 
173,0 
356,0 
74,0 
108,3 
11,9 
194,1 
72,7 
92,2 
0,0 
164,9 
1989 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
217,5 
46,3 
263,9 
1989 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
10,0 
14,6 
24,6 
10,0 
10,2 
20,1 
1989 
10,0 
13,5 
15,0 
38,5 
10,0 
13,5 
0,0 
23,5 
10,0 
0,8 
0,0 
10,8 
1989 
359,5 
343,1 
294,8 
1989 
44,0 
44,0 
56,0 
144,0 
38,2 
42,2 
27,4 
107,7 
23,1 
9,6 
0,4 
33,1 
1989 
74,0 
109,0 
173,0 
356,0 
74,0 
108,3 
122,3 
304,6 
73,2 
95,3 
0,0 
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TUNISIA 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
MAGHREB 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
EGYPT 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
JORDAN 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
LEBANON 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
Overall 
budgets 
54,0 
61,0 
93,0 
208,0 
Overall 
budgets 
172,0 
214,0 
322,0 
708,0 
Overall 
budgets 
77,0 
126,0 
200,0 
403,0 
Overall 
budgets 
22,0 
26,0 
37,0 
85,0 
Overall 
budgets 
10,0 
16,0 
20,0 
46,0 
1979 
54,0 
54,0 
0,7 
0,7 
0,4 
0,4 
1979 
172,0 
172,0 
3,2 
3,2 
0,5 
0,5 
1979 
77,0 
77,0 
2,0 
2,0 
0,8 
0,8 
1979 
22,0 
22,0 
1,2 
1,2 
0,8 
0,8 
1979 
10,0 
10,0 
0,3 
0,3 
0,0 
0,0 
1980 
54,0 
54,0 
3,6 
3,6 
1,1 
1,1 
1980 
172,0 
172,0 
13,4 
13,4 
2,6 
2,6 
1980 
77,0 
77,0 
2,2 
2,2 
1,1 
1,1 
1980 
22,0 
22,0 
2,2 
2,2 
1,1 
1,1 
1980 
10,0 
10,0 
0,7 
0,7 
0,6 
0,6 
1981 
54,0 
54,0 
39,7 
39,7 
12,6 
12,6 
1981 
172,0 
172,0 
143,1 
143,1 
40,0 
40,0 
1981 
77,0 
77,0 
53,5 
53,5 
10,7 
10,7 
1981 
22,0 
22,0 
18,8 
18,8 
6,8 
6,8 
1981 
10,0 
10,0 
3,7 
3,7 
1,3 
1,3 
1982 
54,0 
54,0 
53,1 
53,1 
18,2 
18,2 
1982 
172,0 
172,0 
162,8 
162,8 
65,9 
65,9 
1982 
77,0 
77,0 
67,9 
67,9 
13,0 
13,0 
1982 
22,0 
22,0 
20,0 
20,0 
9,6 
9,6 
1982 
10,0 
10,0 
5,6 
5,6 
2,5 
2,5 
1983 
54,0 
61,0 
115,0 
53,6 
0,0 
53,6 
33,1 
0,0 
33,1 
1983 
172,0 
214,0 
386,0 
165,1 
37,4 
202,5 
108,3 
23,4 
131,7 
1983 
77,0 
126,0 
203,0 
76,0 
11,3 
87,3 
16,1 
0,0 
16,1 
1983 
22,0 
26,0 
48,0 
21,7 
7,8 
29,5 
14,5 
3,2 
17,7 
1983 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
7,1 
0,0 
7,2 
3,7 
0,0 
3,7 
1984 
54,0 
61,0 
115,0 
53,9 
2,9 
56,8 
40,1 
0,2 
40,3 
1984 
172,0 
214,0 
386,0 
166,0 
96,0 
262,0 
119,9 
35,1 
155,0 
1984 
77,0 
126,0 
203,0 
76,2 
35,4 
111,6 
27,4 
0,9 
28,3 
1984 
22,0 
26,0 
48,0 
22,2 
10,8 
33,0 
17,6 
4,7 
22,3 
1984 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
7,1 
0,0 
7,2 
3,8 
0,0 
3,8 
1985 
54,0 
61,0 
115,0 
54,0 
15,5 
69,5 
43,9 
3,8 
47,7 
1985 
172,0 
214,0 
386,0 
166,2 
141,9 
308,0 
132,6 
79,0 
211,6 
1985 
77,0 
126,0 
203,0 
76,2 
52,3 
128,5 
31,7 
2,7 
34,4 
1985 
22,0 
26,0 
48,0 
22,2 
14,6 
36,9 
20,8 
6,9 
27,7 
1985 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
7,3 
16,0 
23,3 
4,0 
0,0 
4,0 
1986 
54,0 
61,0 
115,0 
54,0 
60,7 
114,7 
44,3 
9,5 
53,9 
1986 
172,0 
214,0 
386,0 
166,5 
193,0 
359,5 
134,6 
97,4 
232,1 
1986 
77,0 
126,0 
203,0 
76,3 
66,8 
143,0 
38,4 
10,6 
48,9 
1986 
22,0 
26,0 
48,0 
22,3 
22,1 
44,4 
21,6 
9,8 
31,4 
1986 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
7,4 
16,0 
23,4 
4,6 
0,6 
5,2 
1987 
54,0 
61,0 
115,0 
54,0 
60,7 
114,7 
51,4 
20,2 
71,6 
1987 
172,0 
214,0 
386,0 
163,0 
211,2 
374,1 
145,6 
117,9 
263,5 
1987 
77,0 
126,0 
203,0 
76,3 
112,3 
188,6 
47,5 
22,5 
70,0 
1987 
22,0 
26,0 
48,0 
22,3 
22,9 
45,2 
21,8 
12,8 
34,5 
1987 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
7,0 
16,0 
23,0 
4,8 
1,2 
6,0 
1988 
54,0 
61,0 
93,0 
208,0 
53,7 
61,1 
39,4 
154,1 
52,4 
32,4 
10,8 
95,6 
1988 
172,0 
214,0 
322,0 
708,0 
165,8 
211,5 
51,9 
429,1 
147,2 
132,7 
10,8 
290,7 
1988 
77,0 
126,0 
200,0 
403,0 
76,5 
119,8 
33,9 
230,2 
56,S 
32,4 
0,0 
88,9 
1988 
22,0 
26,0 
37,0 
85,0 
22,3 
24,0 
10,5 
56,9 
21,8 
15,5 
0,0 
37,3 
1988 
10,0 
16,0 
20,0 
46,0 
9,9 
16,0 
0,0 
25,9 
5,4 
1,6 
0,0 
7,0 
1989 
54,0 
61,0 
93,0 
208,0 
53,7 
61,0 
59,7 
174,3 
53,1 
41,1 
13,2 
107,4 
1989 
172,0 
214,0 
322,0 
708,0 
165,8 
211,5 
209,3 
586,7 
149,4 
146,0 
13,6 
309,0 
1989 
77,0 
126,0 
200,0 
403,0 
76,5 
122,7 
44,3 
243,4 
58,1 
54,2 
0,3 
112,6 
1989 
22,0 
26,0 
37,0 
85,0 
22,3 
25,0 
17,4 
64,7 
21,8 
18,1 
2,1 
42,0 
1989 
10,0 
16,0 
20,0 
46,0 
9,9 
16,0 
0,0 
25,9 
5,5 
1,6 
0,0 
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SYRIA 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
MASHREQ 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
SOUTHERN 
MEDITERRANEAN 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
MEDITERRANEAN 
Overall budgets 
Commitments 
Payments 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
1st Protocol 
2nd Protocol 
3rd Protocol 
Total 
Overall 
budgets 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
Overall 
budgets 
135,0 
201,0 
257,0 
593,0 
Overall 
budgets 
307,0 
415,0 
579,0 
1 301,0 
Overall 
budgets 
1 660,5 
1979 
26,0 
26,0 
1,6 
1,6 
0,3 
0,3 
1979 
135,0 
135,0 
5,0 
5,0 
1,9 
1,9 
1979 
307,0 
307,0 
8,2 
8,2 
2,4 
2,4 
1979 
547,0 
21,1 
6,7 
1980 
26,0 
26,0 
2,0 
2,0 
0,6 
0,6 
1980 
135,0 
135,0 
7,0 
7,0 
3,5 
3,5 
1980 
307,0 
307,0 
20,4 
20,4 
6,0 
6,0 
1980 
547,0 
40,3 
10,9 
1981 
26,0 
26,0 
18,2 
18,2 
2,9 
2,9 
1981 
135,0 
135,0 
94,2 
94,2 
21,7 
21,7 
1981 
307,0 
307,0 
237,3 
237,3 
61,8 
61,8 
1981 
622,0 
514,7 
130,2 
1982 
26,0 
26,0 
19,5 
19,5 
6,2 
6,2 
1982 
135,0 
135,0 
113,0 
113,0 
31,3 
31,3 
1982 
307,0 
307,0 
275,7 
275,7 
97,1 
97,1 
1982 
622,0 
557,7 
184,9 
1983 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
19,9 
0,0 
19,9 
11,9 
0,0 
11,9 
1983 
135,0 
201,0 
336,0 
124,8 
19,1 
143,9 
46,1 
3,2 
49,3 
1983 
307,0 
415,0 
722,0 
289,9 
56,5 
346,4 
154,4 
26,6 
181,0 
1983 
1 037,0 
632,4 
312,8 
1984 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
25,3 
9,7 
35,0 
16,0 
0,0 
16,0 
1984 
135,0 
201,0 
336,0 
130,8 
55,9 
186,7 
64,8 
5,6 
70,4 
1984 
307,0 
415,0 
722,0 
296,8 
152,0 
448,8 
184,7 
40,7 
225,4 
1984 
1 053,0 
734,7 
397,3 
1985 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
25,5 
18,4 
43,9 
18,5 
0,0 
18,5 
1985 
135,0 
201,0 
336,0 
131,2 
101,4 
232,6 
75,0 
9,6 
84,6 
1985 
307,0 
415,0 
722,0 
297,4 
243,3 
540,6 
207,6 
88,6 
296,2 
1985 
1 053,0 
833,4 
502,2 
1986 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
25,7 
31,6 
57,3 
19,5 
0,8 
20,3 
1986 
135,0 
201,0 
336,0 
131,7 
136,5 
268,2 
84,0 
21,8 
105,8 
1986 
307,0 
415,0 
722,0 
298,2 
329,5 
627,6 
218,6 
119,2 
337,8 
1986 
1066,5 
924,0 
600,9 
1987 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
26,0 
31,6 
57,6 
19,9 
2,4 
22,3 
1987 
135,0 
201,0 
336,0 
131,6 
182,9 
314,4 
94,0 
38,8 
132,8 
1987 
307,0 
415,0 
722,0 
294,5 
394,0 
688,5 
239,6 
156,7 
396,3 
1987 
1066,5 
997,9 
675,8 
1988 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
19,9 
7,2 
27,2 
1988 
135,0 
201,0 
257,0 
593,0 
134,7 
192,9 
44,4 
372,0 
103,7 
56,7 
0,0 
160,4 
1988 
307,0 
415,0 
579,0 
1 301,0 
300,5 
404,4 
96,2 
801,1 
250,9 
189,5 
10,8 
451,2 
1988 
1645,5 
1 140,0 
742,3 
1989 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
20,2 
9,9 
30,2 
1989 
135,0 
201,0 
257,0 
593,0 
134,7 
196,7 
61,7 
393,1 
105,6 
83,8 
2,4 
191,8 
1989 
307,0 
415,0 
579,0 
1 301,0 
300,5 
408,2 
271,0 
979,8 
255,0 
229,8 
15,9 
500,8 
1989 
1 660,5 
1322,9 
795,6 
The difference of 54 Mio ECU between the total overall budgetary amount shown in this table (1 660,5 Mio ECU) and the amount shown in Table 1 (1 714,5 Mio 
ECU) is due to the fact that the above table does not include the Third Protocol with Cyprus (18 Mio ECU), which entered into force in 1990, or the reserve (36 Mio 
ECU) for the Third Protocol with Syria which had not yet been signed as of 31.12.1989. Due to the effects of rounding, some totals do not correspond exactly to the 
sum of the component items (e.g. Syria, 1988 and 1989 payments). No C 252/10  Official Journal of the European Communities  26. 9. 91 
Table 3 — Utilization of overall budgets for Protocols at the 
end of the financial year in which the Protocols expired 
(%) 
Country or 
geographical 
area 
Turkey 
Cyprus 
Malta 
Algeria 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Maghreb 
Egypt 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Mashreq 
Southern 
Mediterranean 
Protocol 
Third 
special aid 
First 
Second 
First 
Second 
First 
Second 
First 
Second 
First 
Second 
First 
Second 
First 
Second 
First 
Second 
First 
Second 
First 
Second 
First 
Second 
First 
Second 
Commit-
ments 
tracted 
100,0 
61,3 
99,6 
65,0 
100,0 
100,0 
66,9 
54,5 
100,0 
99,3 
73,5 
99,5 
83,2 
90,2 
69,4 
53,0 
85,6 
85,0 
55,8 
100,0 
70,1 
95,8 
69,8 
67,9 
77,3 
79,4 
Payments 
effected 
27,8 
5,3 
23,0 
51,6 
73,6 
0,0 
4,7 
10,0 
34,3 
82,7 
23,3 
17,7 
23,3 
45,5 
13,9 
8,4 
31,1 
37,7 
25,4 
3,8 
11,2 
2,5 
16,1 
10,9 
20,1 
28,7 
Association Council. This decision should be based on an 
examination of the situation regarding cooperation with 
the country concerned and should be taken on the expiry of 
the implementing period for the Protocol, or near to that 
time. Following this decision, the balance should either be 
transferred, in full or in part, to the finance allocated to the 
next Protocol or it should be cancelled, so as to put an end 
to the current series of unclosed Protocols. 
Allocation of grant aid 
3.16. The Protocols are drawn up in such a way that non-
reimbursable aid, in the form of grants, financed from 
budgetary resources, is used in the first instance to satisfy 
EIB needs. The aim is to allow it to grant the interest-rate 
subsidies that are an essential precondition for and are 
automatically linked to the signing of loan contracts up to 
the maximum amount that the EIB is authorized to make. 
The forward management of the financing packages is thus 
organized in such a way as to ensure that the EIB always has 
a source of funds from which to finance interest-rate 
subsidies. 
3.17. The EIB is not, however, able to make its actual 
requirements known right from the outset of the implemen-
tation of a protocol, which makes it difficult to provide for 
strict planning of the financings and tends to defer the use 
of a part of the Commission's budgetary resources. 
3.18. Fixing the overall amount of budgetary funds 
intended to finance interest-rate subsidies in the Protocol 
itself would be one way of getting round this difficulty. The 
Commission and the recipient country would thus have 
accurate information from the outset as to how much 
money was available for use in the form of interest-rate 
subsidies. It should be pointed out here that the EDF's 
budget contains an overall sum that is reserved for interest-
rate subsidies. 
The consequences as regards implementation 
3.19. The implementation of the Protocols does not 
adhere to the theoretical five-yearly framework. As a result, 
there is a series of unclosed Protocols, the most blatant 
examples being those with Algeria and Egypt: the balance 
of uncommitted funds at the end of the implementing 
period for the first two series of Protocols with these two 
countries varies between 30 % and 50 % of their overall 
budgets (see Tables 2 to 4 and Graphs 8 and 12). If this 
situation is to be prevented from worsening, it is up to the 
Commission to take the appropriate measures when 
concluding future Protocols. 
3.20. The Court considers that, whilst a measure of 
flexibility should be retained (see paragraph 3.14), stricter 
provisions governing the timetable for using funds 
allocated for this purpose are required in order to put a stop 
to this uncontrolled drift. Whatever provisions may be 
adopted, they should include a mechanism for closing 
unclosed Protocols, which would lead to a formal decision 
as to the utilization of the balance (see paragraph 3.15). 
Implementing Regulation 
3.21. The absence of any implementing regulation until 
the beginning of 1987 (see Annex 2, paragraphs 14— 17), 
i.e. for nearly eight years, was a major shortcoming. Besides 
the fact that it deprives the Commission of its managerial 
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during this period sometimes produced considerable delays 
in the adoption of projects on account of the need for a 
unanimous vote. Each Member State has a right of veto, 
which means that, if it so wishes, it can hold up the 
Commission's activities in order to settle a dispute with the 
country which is to receive the envisaged aid. 
3.22. The implementing Regulation, (EEC) No 3973/86, 
makes specific references, in its recitals, to the Second 
Protocols with the Maghreb and the Mashreq countries 
and Cyprus and Malta only. At the very least a Council 
regulation should have extended the scope of Regulation 
(EEC) No 3973/86 to include the Third Protocols, and that 
need still exists. Appropriate provisions should, moreover, 
be immediately adopted as soon as the forthcoming Fourth 
Protocols have been concluded. The same applies to 
financial and technical cooperation with Turkey, which is 
still not covered by an implementing regulation (see 
Annex 2, paragraph 17). 
Observations on the system of Protocols 
3.23. A comparison may be made between this system of 
Protocols and the system that applies to the financial and 
technical aid that the Community gives to Asian and Latin 
American developing countries (PVDALA). This aid, 
which is financed from Chapter 93 of the general budget, 
has its sole legal foundation in Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 442/81 (
!), which lays down the general objectives,the 
forms, the fields of application as well as the Community's 
decision-making and internal management procedures. 
3.24. The Protocols, which result precisely from the 
Community's wish to institute a policy based on a global 
approach, constitute an appropriate framework within 
which to provide, durably and with a pre-established 
overall budget, sectoral guidance for financial and 
technical cooperation of a form that meets the priority 
objectives for development adopted by each of the recipient 
countries. The planning stage is essential in this respect. 
The Third Protocols with the Maghreb and Mashreq 
countries and Malta and Cyprus did, moreover, constitute 
a considerable improvement on the previous ones. Their 
specific cooperation objectives are much more precise, they 
define the nature of the projects or measures likely to be 
financed and they require the drawing-up of an indicative 
programme committing both parties. 
3.25. The lack of multiannual planning until the end of 
1990 within the framework of financial and technical aid to 
(!) OJNoL48, 21. 2. 1981, p. 8. 
the PVDALA and the artificial pressure of annual and 
budgetary timetables are recognized by the Commission as 
amounting to a considerable weakness. Plans exist to 
introduce multiannual planning as from 1991, which 
would make for improved utilization of financial re-
sources. 
3.26. Though, in principle, the Protocols do make for more 
efficient and effective utilization than a system with no 
planning, in practice, certain weaknesses may be observed. 
3.27. First of all, the Protocols form an additional stage, 
compared with the system governing the financial and 
technical aid to the PVDALA. The slowness that is inherent 
in the process for negotiating and concluding Proto-
cols (which only provide a legal framework for five years), 
which is sometimes affected by other factors that are not 
directly related to financial and technical cooperation (see 
paragraphs 3.1 — 3.5), has the effect of delaying im-
plementation and even of interrupting the continuity of 
financial and technical cooperation (see paragraph 3.7). 
3.28. The Protocols involve, moreover, a vast amount of 
identification work, the carrying-out of studies and the 
drawing-up of projects at the beginning of their period of 
application. This represents a considerable volume of 
work, both for the Commission and the recipient countries, 
which has to be completed in a very short space of time. 
The Court wonders whether some of the weaknesses found 
in the quality of the projects and measures financed are 
caused by the hastiness with which this preparatory work is 
carried out. 
3.29. Moreover, by fixing a well-defined overall budget 
that is available for a specific period, the Protocols are 
likely to encourage competition between potential re-
cipients in the countries concerned. This may result in 
projects that are badly or inadequately conceived and 
which, in part if not wholly, are aimed at keeping back a 
share of the overall amount made available by the 
Community for the bodies submitting them. This weakness 
is not found in financial and technical aid to the PVDALA 
because, while it is also necessary to choose between 
projects, given the limited volume of Community aid, their 
effects are more widespread since there is not this dual limit 
of an overall budget that is clearly determined and non-
extendable and related to a multiannual implementing 
period. 
3.30. One disadvantage of the system of Protocols 
concerns the impact on budgetary implementation of 
factors which, although alien to financial and technical 
cooperation,prevent its normal operation. The implemen-
tation of the Protocols with Turkey, Syria and Lebanon has 
been blocked for political reasons: the Community has not 
repudiated its commitments in respect of any of the 
recipient countries concerned, the implementation of the 
financial and technical cooperation has merely been 
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possible again. In the specific cases of Lebanon and Syria, 
the overall packages granted or earmarked for the Third 
Protocols will be added to those to be granted, normally at 
the end of 1991, within the framework of the Fourth 
Protocols, which is not likely to improve the rate of 
budgetary implementation. In the case of financial and 
technical aid to the PVDALA, the Commission may, under 
such circumstances, decide not to undertake any more 
commitments, i.e. not to take any more financing decisions. 
3.31. Finally, as things stand, and mainly on account of 
the provisions governing the use of the balance (see 
paragraphs 3.13 — 3.15), the overall budget provided for 
in the Protocol is legally due to the recipient country and it 
may not be called into question by slow implementation. 
Financial and technical aid to the PVDALA makes it 
possible, on the contrary, to adapt the volume and rate of 
cooperation to each country's own absorption capacities. 
The Commission has the possibility of refusing to finance 
new projects when it finds that there are difficulties or 
delays in the utilization of the aid that has already been 
made available to the country concerned. 
4. THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
The accounting systems 
Presentation of the systems 
4.1. The Commission has two tools: 
a) the budgetary accounting system, with which to 
implement the budget correctly. For a given financial 
year and down to the level of individual accounting 
commitments, it gives the details of payments made 
and outstanding commitments at the beginning and 
end of the financial year. This is the information that is 
set out in the revenue and expenditure account; 
b) an auxiliary accounting system, known as FINPICS 
(Project Information and Control System), the aim of 
which is to meet the administrators' specific needs as 
regards the follow-up of projects and the implemen-
tation of Financial Protocols (
!). It is a database 
0) The FINPICS system is not only for aid under the Financial 
Protocols; it is also used for aid to developing countries in 
Latin America and Asia financed under Chapter 93 of the 
general budget. 
containing chronological details of the payments made 
for each accounting commitment. 
Monitoring the implementation of the Protocols 
4.2. Neither the budgetary accounting nor the FINPICS 
system in its present form provides constant and directly 
available information, in respect of each Financial 
Protocol, on the distribution of the amounts committed 
and the amounts paid, according to the nature of the 
financial instruments. These observations also hold true of 
a sectoral analysis of financial operations that the EIB 
carries out on its own initiative, in particular for the loans 
on special terms that it manages under a broad mandate 
(see Annex 2, paragraph 23). The Commission should 
consider, in any event as from the next Protocols, equipping 
itself with the means necessary to obtain easy access to this 
type of information. 
4.3. The budgetary accounting system is not equal to the 
task of providing constant and direct access to information 
on the state of financial implementation of the Protocols. 
Some items of revenue, repayments made by the EIB of 
excess funds supplied by the Commission (on the payment 
of interest subsidies or when a loan instalment under 
special conditions is released) are not re-used for the project 
concerned and are credited to sundry revenue. In order to 
be able to make available to the EIB the whole amount 
agreed upon for the loan or interest subsidies, the 
Commission is then obliged to make further commitments 
from new appropriations. The budgetary accounts then 
show amounts committed and paid which are higher than 
those of the aid fixed and actually paid. As can be seen in 
Table 4, the total amount committed for a Financial 
Protocol, as reconstituted from the budgetary accounting 
system, is thus higher than the overall amount of the 
financing package (First Protocols with Malta and Jordan, 
First and Second Protocols with Syria). 
4.4. The FINPICS system is established and updated 
incorrectly, in that it does not reconstitute all the 
accounting transactions. It does not include several 
commitments established in 1979, nor does it take account 
of possible revenue, whether re-used or not. 
4.5. It thus makes it difficult to close the Financial 
Protocols if the Commission cannot retrace the debits and 
credits and is unaware of any balances available for re-use. 
To bring the FINPICS system up to scratch would not 
result in insuperable difficulties. It would involve in-
corporating all omitted commitments as well as revenue 
received. The Commission would then have a system 
providing it with a readily available and reliable picture of 
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Tabic 4 — Utilization of overall budgets for Protocols and validation of commitments entered into at 31.12.1989 
Country or 
geographical 
(1) 
TURKEY 
CYPRUS 
MALTA 
NORTHERN MED-
ITERRANEAN 
ALGERIA 
MOROCCO 
TUNISIA 
MAGHREB 
EGYPT 
JORDAN 
LEBANON 
SYRIA 
MASHREQ 
SOUTHERN MED-
ITERRANEAN 
MEDITER-
RANEAN 
Protocol 
(2) 
3rd 
Spec, aic 
1st 
2nd 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
1st 
2nd 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
1 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Overall 
budgets 
(Mio ECU) 
(3) 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
10,0 
16,0 
26,0 
10,0 
13,5 
15,0 
38,5 
359,5 
44,0 
44,0 
56,0 
144,0 
74,0 
109,0 
173,0 
356,0 
54,0 
61,0 
93,0 
208,0 
172,0 
214,0 
322,0 
708,0 
77,0 
126,0 
200,0 
403,0 
22,0 
26,0 
37,0 
85,0 
10,0 
16,0 
20,0 
46,0 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
135,0 
201,0 
257,0 
593,0 
307,0 
415,0 
579,0 
1 301,0 
1 660,5 
Commitment situation 
Commitments 
"too"
1 
(Mio ECU) 
(4) 
220,0 
75,0 
295,0 
10,0 
14,6 
24,6 
10,0 
13,5 
0,0 
23,5 
343,1 
38,2 
42,2 
27,4 
107,7 
74,0 
108,3 
122,3 
304,6 
53,7 
61,0 
59,7 
174,3 
165,8 
211,5 
209,3 
586,7 
76,5 
122,7 
44,3 
243,4 
22,3 
25,0 
17,4 
64,7 
9,9 
16,0 
0,0 
25,9 
26,0 
33,0 
59,0 
134,7 
196,7 
61,7 
393,1 
300,5 
408,2 
271,0 
979,8 
1322,9 
Unutilized 
finance 
3-4 
(Mio ECU) 
(5) 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
1,4 
1,4 
(0,0) 
0,0 
15,0 
15,0 
16,4 
5,8 
1,8 
28,6 
36,3 
0,0 
0,7 
50,7 
51,4 
0,3 
0,0 
33,4 
33,7 
6,2 
2,5 
112,7 
121,3 
0,5 
3,3 
155,7 
159,6 
(0,3) 
1,0 
19,6 
20,3 
0,1 
0,0 
20,0 
20,1 
(0,0) 
(0,0) 
(0,0) 
0,3 
4,3 
195,3 
199,9 
6,5 
6,8 
308,0 
321,2 
337,6 
Utilization 
of 
finance 
4/3 
(%) 
(6) 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
99,6 
91,4 
94,6 
100,0 
100,0 
0,0 
61,0 
95,4 
86,8 
95,9 
48,9 
74,8 
100,0 
99,4 
70,7 
85,6 
99,4 
100,0 
64,1 
83,8 
96,4 
98,8 
65,0 
82,9 
99,3 
97,4 
22,1 
60,4 
101,4 
96,3 
47,0 
76,1 
99,4 
100,0 
0,0 
56,4 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
99,8 
97,9 
24,0 
66,3 
97,9 
98,4 
46,8 
75,3 
79,7 
Payment situation 
Payments 
(Mio ECU) 
(7) 
217,5 
46,3 
263,9 
10,0 
10,2 
20,1 
10,0 
0,8 
0,0 
10,8 
294,8 
23,1 
9,6 
0,4 
33,1 
73,2 
95,3 
0,0 
168,5 
53,1 
41,1 
13,2 
107,4 
149,4 
146,0 
13,6 
309,0 
58,1 
54,2 
0,3 
112,6 
21,8 
18,1 
2,1 
42,0 
5,5 
1,6 
0,0 
7,1 
20,2 
9,9 
30,2 
105,6 
83,8 
2,4 
191,8 
255,0 
229,8 
15,9 
500,8 
795,6 
Unutilized 
finance 
3-7 
(Mio ECU) 
(8) 
2,5 
28,7 
31,1 
0,0 
5,8 
5,9 
0,0 
12,7 
15,0 
27,7 
64,7 
20,9 
34,4 
55,6 
110,9 
0,8 
13,7 
173,0 
187,5 
0,9 
19,9 
79,8 
100,6 
22,6 
68,0 
308,4 
399,0 
18,9 
71,8 
199,7 
290,4 
0,2 
7,9 
34,9 
43,0 
4,5 
14,4 
20,0 
38,9 
5,8 
23,1 
28,8 
29,4 
117,2 
254,6 
401,2 
52,0 
185,2 
563,1 
800,2 
864,9 
Utilization 
of finance 
7/3 
(%) 
(9) 
98,9 
61,8 
89,4 
99,6 
63,6 
77,5 
100,0 
5,9 
0,0 
28,0 
82,0 
52,5 
21,8 
0,7 
23,0 
98,9 
87,4 
0,0 
47,3 
98,4 
67,4 
14,2 
51,6 
86,9 
68,2 
4,2 
43,6 
75,5 
43,0 
0,1 
27,9 
99,1 
69,6 
5,6 
49,4 
54,9 
10,1 
0,0 
15,4 
77,9 
30,1 
51,2 
78,2 
41,7 
0,9 
32,3 
83,1 
55,4 
2,8 
38,5 
47,9 
Outstanding 
commitments 
4-7 
(Mio ECU) 
(10) 
2,5 
28,7 
31,1 
0,0 
4,5 
4,5 
0,0 
12,7 
0,0 
12,7 
48,3 
15,1 
32,6 
27,0 
74,7 
0,8 
13,1 
122,3 
136,1 
0,5 
19,9 
46,5 
66,9 
16,4 
65,6 
195,8 
277,7 
18,4 
68,5 
44,0 
130,9 
0,5 
6,9 
15,3 
22,8 
4,5 
14,4 
0,0 
18,8 
5,8 
23,1 
28,8 
29,1 
112,9 
59,3 
201,3 
45,5 
178,4 
255,1 
479,0 
527,3 
Commitments 
validated 
7/4 
(%) 
(11) 
98,9 
61,8 
89,4 
100,0 
69,6 
81,9 
100,0 
5,9 
45,9 
85,9 
60,5 
22,8 
1,4 
30,7 
99,0 
87,9 
0,0 
55,3 
99,0 
67,4 
22,1 
61,6 
90,1 
69,0 
6,5 
52,7 
76,0 
44,2 
0,7 
46,2 
97,7 
72,3 
11,9 
64,8 
55,2 
10,1 
27,4 
77,8 
30,1 
51,2 
78,4 
42,6 
3,8 
48,8 
84,9 
56,3 
5,9 
51,1 
60,1 
The differences of 54 Mio ECU between the total overall budgetary amount shown in column 3 (1 660,5 Mio ECU) and the amount shown in Table 1 
(1 714,5 Mio ECU) is due to the fact that the above table does not include the Third Protocol with Cyprus, which entered into force in 1990, or the reserve (36 Mio 
ECU) for the Third Protocol with Syria which had not yet been signed as of 31.12.1989. 
The figures in brackets in column 5 are negative because the amount of commitments is in excess of the overall budget. (0,0) indicates that the negative amount is 
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Financial monitoring of the projects 
4.6. The Commission has no information system show-
ing the projects' actual state of financial implementation. 
4.7. The information supplied in the statement of 
payments is inadequate in several respects. First of all, it 
takes no account of revenue (see paragraph 4.3). During its 
records-based audit of projects financed in Turkey, the 
Court had to reconstitute payments out and revenue 
received in order to establish what had actually been paid 
to the recipients. Moreover, there are sometimes abnorm-
ally long delays in the accounting for local payments made 
from the paying agent's account. In the case of projects 
financed in Egypt, these delays may be up to two years and 
involve several hundred thousands of ECU. Furthermore, 
delays in the decommitment of unused appropriations, 
apart from unnecessarily immobilizing appropriations, 
create the illusion, sometimes for several years, that a 
project is still being implemented when it has in fact been 
completed. This sort of situation was noted in the case of 
projects financed in Morocco, Egypt and Turkey. Sound 
financial management requires both the accounting for 
local payments and the decommitment of unused appropri-
ations to be effected as quickly as possible. 
4.8. Each project is normally covered by a single 
accounting commitment but often includes different types 
of measure (supply of equipment, technical assistance, 
construction work, etc.), which are defined, along with the 
estimated cost, in the financing agreement. Each of these 
measures then often gives rise to several contracts (separate 
batches, multiple contractors, etc.). 
4.9. Whereas it has developed a system to manage the 
EDF, the Commission has not created anything com-
parable which would help it to monitor, by individual 
measure and contract, the situation regarding 'secondary' 
commitments entered into in respect of third parties 
(contracts signed, etc.) and the payments made. Such a 
monitoring device is, however, an essential prerequisite of 
sound financial management, and would, in particular, 
make it possible to detect immediately any specific 
implementation difficulties, such as overspending on a 
measure or delays or blockages affecting the implemen-
tation of certain measures or contracts. 
4.10. The most conscientious administrators keep, on 
their own initiative and usually by hand, a record of 
secondary commitments and payments, by contract and, 
less frequently, by measure. Apart from the fact that they 
are not always correctly updated, these records are 
extremely heterogeneous and subject to errors or omis-
sions. 
4.11. The Court takes the view that the Commission 
should give absolute priority to setting up a harmonized 
system which meets the above-mentioned criteria and to 
making the information in this system available to all of its 
departments that are responsible for implementing the 
Protocols. To this end the Commission could well base 
itself on the computerized system that its Moroccan 
delegation has installed for its own needs. It should also be 
pointed out that the Commission is currently developing a 
similar system known as 'OLAS' (On-Line Accounting 
System) for the EDF. This basic requirement of sound 
financial management is not confined to financial cooper-
ation with Mediterranean countries: financial cooperation 
with the PVDALA suffers from the same shortcomings. 
The measures entrusted to the EIB 
4.12. This section of the report is concerned more 
specifically with loans on special terms and under a broad 
mandate, in respect of which the EIB has been invested with 
the broadest responsibilities. The Court's objective is to 
examine whether the current procedures and systems 
enable the Commission to manage the Community's 
budgetary resources adequately. 
Legal basis of the EIB mandates 
4.13. The Court reiterates the reservations that it 
formulated in its annual report in respect of the financial 
year 1982 (
a), i.e. that it is worth enquiring whether the 
Commission in fact had the legal powers required in order 
to confer upon the EIB, in November 1978 (see Annex 2, 
paragraph 19), the management of certain appropriations 
entered in the general budget. The signed agreements are 
not in fact based on any text signed by the Council and the 
First Protocols make no mention of the distribution of 
responsibilities between the EIB and the Commission. 
Moreover, there are no implementing provisions defining 
them, and the 'ad hoc' procedure has not yet been 
established (see Annex 2, paragraphs 14 — 17). 
4.14. The Agreement signed on 16 June 1987, which 
relates to the implementation of the Third Protocols with 
the Maghreb and Mashreq countries, refers to Article 3 of 
Regulation (EEC) No 3973/86. This Regulation, however, 
constitutes the implementing provisions for the Second 
Protocols (see paragraph 3.22). The second mandate was 
therefore given without a correct legal basis. This also 
applies to the extension, in November 1989, of this same 
Agreement to cover the Protocols with Cyprus and Malta. 
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The Commission's role 
4.15. As regards the loans on special terms under broad 
mandate and operations concerning the formation of risk 
capital, the EIB has been given full responsibility for 
identifying, appraising and negotiating without the need 
for any intervention by or direct involvement of the 
Commission. The latter is, of course, consulted on the 
financing projects, but its prerogatives are in fact very 
limited. The financing proposals submitted to it do not 
contain sufficient details to allow the projects' technical 
merits to be assessed. After that it no longer has any control 
over the decision to grant finance. The 'ad hoc' procedure, 
which is based on the principle of unanimous voting, has 
left all the decision-making power to the Council for almost 
eight years, in an area which concerns day-to-day 
management. Regulation (EEC) No 3973/86 in its turn 
allows the Commission the right to oppose (Article 11(2)) 
any EIB financing proposal which leads to consultation of 
the Council, as the authority empowered to take the final 
decision. So the Commission's prerogatives are not thereby 
increased. 
4.16. The situation is particularly worrying as regards 
interest-rate subsidies. Here again the 'ad hoc' procedure 
has the consequences referred to in paragraph 4.15. The 
decision-making procedure adopted by Regulation (EEC) 
No 3973/86 (Article 11(4)) leaves, in the absence of a 
favourable opinion from the Article 9 Committee, the 
power of final decision to the EIB's Board of Directors. In 
its Opinion No 2/86 (*) on the draft implementing financial 
regulation, the Court has already criticized the fact that this 
mechanism does not allow the competent authority to 
maintain any control over the appropriations entered in the 
general budget, with a view to ensuring implementation. 
4.17. The proposals for implementing financial regu-
lations submitted by the Commission to the Council in 
1977 and 1978 (see Annex 2, paragraph 16) and Regulation 
(EEC) No 3973/86 require the Commission to ensure that 
the EIB carries out its mandate and that the conditions 
under which the projects are used by the recipients are 
satisfactory. At present, the procedures and systems in 
force do not allow the Commission to comply with these 
requirements satisfactorily. 
4.18. Under the terms of its mandate, the EIB is not 
bound to send the Commission the necessary documents, in 
particular the progress and inspection reports. Up until 
1984 the Commission did not even have any copies of the 
financing contracts. The annual report that the EIB submits 
to the Commission boils down to a list of financing 
decisions and summary financial statements. On-the-spot 
inspections and visits of projects receiving finance are only 
carried out by representatives of the EIB itself. 
(*) OJ No C 302, 27. 11. 1986, p. 6, 6th recital. 
4.19. As the Court discovered during a documentary 
audit of two projects financed in Turkey for a total amount 
of 160 Mio ECU under the Third Protocol, the result of this 
situation is a total lack of information in the Commission's 
files regarding the implementation and results of the 
projects. The EIB mandate, however, expressly limits its 
responsibilities 'to the sound implementation of the 
mandate, in accordance with banking practice'. The 
development objectives are not mentioned and remain the 
Commission's full responsibility. The latter should 
therefore procure, on its own initiative or via the EIB, the 
information that it requires for this purpose. In its special 
report (
2) on the EIB's management of Community 
development aid funds, the Court has already commented 
on the inadequate nature of the Commission's files in 
respect of projects financed by the EDF or by the Protocols 
and managed by the EIB. The Court reiterated its 
observations in its annual report for the financial year 
1985 (
3). 
4.20. The Commission does not make appropriate use of 
the financial information available to it. Thus, for the same 
two projects financed in Turkey referred to under 
paragraph 4.19, the absence of a statement of payments 
made to the EIB and repayments made by it made it 
difficult, at the time of the audit, for the Court to assess the 
extent to which accounting commitments had been 
validated and loans on special terms had been utilized. 
4.21. The Commission does not attempt to keep up to 
date an aggregate statement of part payments against loans 
from EIB own resources which are receiving interest-rate 
subsidies. This would allow it, however, once the loans had 
been fully disbursed, to decommit immediately any 
appropriations not used for interest-rate subsidies. Under 
the present arrangement, the Commission waits to be 
informed by the EIB that a loan has been disbursed before 
acting. As the Court observed in the case of projects 
financed in Morocco, this may mean that the appropri-
ations remain unnecessarily committed for several years. 
4.22. The Commission is therefore not in a position to 
fulfil its responsibilities in respect of the implementation of 
the budget. It is impossible for the Commission to know 
whether budgetary funds allocated to finance measures 
managed under mandate by the EIB (see paragraph 4.12) 
have been utilized in accordance with the Financial 
Regulation and make it possible for the desired objectives 
to be achieved. 
4.23. In conjunction with the EIB, the Commission 
should establish the procedures necessary for it to obtain 
sufficient information on projects managed under broad 
mandate by the EIB. As is, for example, required by the 
Committee for Development Banks, which manages aid to 
(
2) Special report No 2/84, adopted on 10.5.1984. This report has 
not been published but is obtainable from the Court of 
Auditors. 
(
3) OJ No C 321, 15. 12. 1986, p. 146, paragraph 73. No C 252/16 Official Journal of the European Communities 26. 9. 91 
the PVDALA on behalf of the Community, the Commis-
sion should at least be kept informed of the following: 
a) a detailed description of projects together with the 
technical and economic assessments; 
b) periodic reports on each project's progress; 
c) reports on on-the-spot inspections carried out by the 
EIB; 
d) any recommendations for technical changes sent by the 
EIB to the project managers. 
The Commission should have full entitlement to par-
ticipate in on-the-spot inspections by the EIB and should be 
free to make such audit visits as it desires on its own 
initiative, in accordance with procedures to be laid down 
jointly with the EIB. 
Measures managed by the Commission 
The aid management system 
4.24. The quality of the information available in the 
Commission's files, like its monitoring of project im-
plementation, was very uneven and generally insufficient. 
4.25. The projects financed in Malta and Turkey were 
characterized by a shortage of information on implemen-
tation; there was nothing to indicate whether the 
development objectives had been, or would be, achieved. 
There was no fundamental difference in the case of projects 
financed in Egypt, over the achievement of which the 
Commission does not generally exercise enough control; in 
the case of the agricultural projects, the situation has 
improved recently, following staff changes in the deleg-
ation. Supervision of the projects financed in Algeria was 
similarly insufficient, and it was impossible for the 
Commission to evaluate the results of them. 
4.26. The situation was less open to criticism in the case 
of Morocco, where information concerning the actual 
execution of the measures financed by the Community was 
generally available to the Commission; the information 
was incomplete, however, in that the flow stopped once the 
Community financial contribution had been used up, and 
the information itself did not always cover measures 
financed by the Moroccan contribution; generally speak-
ing, it was once again impossible for the Commission to 
assess the effectiveness of these projects. 
4.27. There are various factors that give rise to situations 
of this kind. They all have their origin in the fact that the 
Commission has omitted to set up an adequate project 
management system. 
The sharing of responsibilities 
4.28. The provisions regarding the division of re-
sponsibilities between the various Commission depart-
ments (see Annex 2, paragraph 31) are not always as 
precise as they should be, and they are not always complied 
with. The system was seen to be blurred in outline and too 
complicated; the extreme sub-division of tasks made it 
difficult to prevent dilution of responsibilities. For 
example, execution of the credit operation on behalf of 
small farmers (Morocco) was monitored by neither the 
officer responsible for the geographical area nor by the 
officer responsible for the technical aspects, who was 
convinced that this was a project which was being managed 
by the EIB under mandate. In the case of the Beypazari 
lignite mines project (Turkey), the Commission sent 
invoices to the EIB for payment in November 1987, even 
though this project was not covered by the EIB's mandate 
either. Neither DG I nor DG VIII took responsibility for 
the Lignite prospecting project (Turkey) and a commitment 
of almost 160 000 ECU has been outstanding for five years, 
even though the expenditure to be borne by the Commis-
sion has been paid in full. 
4.29. The Commission should ensure that the division of 
responsibilities between the various departments con-
cerned is clear and that it is respected. 
Instructions 
4.30. The Commission had not issued any instructions 
regarding the structure and content of the files on the 
projects and measures financed or the nature, frequency or 
recommended form of the monitoring and of the inform-
ation to be provided by the central departments and the 
delegations. These had been left to individual initiative, 
and in consequence the quality of the files and of the 
supervision was very uneven. 
4.31. The delegations generally draw up annual reports 
with a special profile for each project or measure. 
Frequently the comments varied little from one year to the 
next, which raises questions as to the standard of the 
monitoring on which they are based; the Court, for its part, ^.9.91  COfficial]ournal of the European Communities  ^oC^gfB 
has found such reports to he oflimited use in preparingfor 
missionsto the countries concerned. 
4.3^. The files held hy the geographical and technical 
officers were often poorly maintained or incomplete and 
were very difficult to use asatool for ascertaining the state 
of progress of projects or measures^ identifying particular 
weaknesses or problems and evaluating results.Phis was 
particularly true of the projects and measures financed in 
^gyptandPurkey which the Court examined. 
4.33. A special effort must he made to improve the 
quality of these files. Cuidelines should be issued^ so as to 
harmonize the organisation and presentation of them.A 
systemofperiodicfollowup cards ^forexampleatsix^ 
monthly intervals^ couldbecreated.^fhese cards would 
indicate^forexample^ina very brief form^the state of 
progress ofaproject^ particular weaknesses or problems 
encountered^ action undertaken or envisaged and the 
results achieved or to be expected^ as well as the extent to 
which theobjectives were beingachieved^thesystemofsix^ 
monthly reports and ^warning signals'introduced by the 
^fo^isauseful example in this context.Phis approach 
should also be adopted for the annual reports compiled by 
thedelegations^whichin turn should begiven the attention 
they need if they are to be of real value. 
4.34. The Commission does not always ensure that the 
recipients fulfil their obligations to submit work program 
mes^ which is^ however^ stipulated in the financing 
agreement. In theabsenceof workprogrammesit was 
impossible for the Commissiontotellwhetheractivities 
receiving finance were in fact part ofprojects^ as in the case 
of the fodder improvement and fodder production 
improvement projects in f^gypt. 
4.3^. ^ome financing agreements do not require the aid 
recipients to submit implementation reports to the 
Commission. .Phis applied to the projects financed in 
Turkey up till 19^ underthespecial aid arrangements and 
to most ofthe projects financedin^ialta. The Commission 
did not haveadelegationinTurkey until i9^ and it has 
not always had a representative in ^ialta. Under these 
conditions^ project monitoring becomes awkward^ to say 
the least. 
4.3^. Inhere is a similar obligation in the case of the 
projects financed in the Maghreb and ^iashreq countries^ 
but recipients frequently fail to comply with it.Phe Court 
was able to confirm this view when it reviewedasizeable 
number of projects in ^gypt and ^iorocco.TheCommis 
sionwasunusuallyunresponsivetosuchcases.tr is also the 
case that^ if the Community is providing the finance fora 
technical assistance measure for a projects both the 
Commission andthe recipient tendto consider that the 
reports compiled by the experts areasubstitute for those 
which recipients are required to supply. 
4.3^. .Phe financing agreements are very vague as to the 
nature and extent of the information which must be 
provided in the implementation reports. Asaresult^ the 
quality of these reports is frequently inadequate.They are 
veryoften confined toasimple description of the work 
carried out using Community funds and say nothing about 
measures financed with the recipient country'sown funds. 
In any case^ they are rarely of any use asamanagement 
tool. 
4.3^. I^heCommissionshouldensurethatrecipientsfulfil 
the obligations imposed on them under the terms of the 
financingagreements. I^he latter documents^ moreover^ 
should define far more precisely the nature and extent of 
the information which is to be included in the workD 
programmes and implementation reports. Hiey should 
provide full information on both financial matters and on 
site work^ which means that they must cover all the 
measures proposed as part of the projects not just those 
financed with Community funds. I^hese programmes and 
reports should also provide an evaluation of the state of 
progressofthe project — both expected and achieved — in 
termsof theattainmentof thedevelopmentobjectives^ 
theseobjectives must beclearly set out and quantifiedin the 
financing agreement^furthermoremn view of the timelag 
between thecompletionofacapitalprojectandthepointat 
which its effects begin to befell programmes and reports 
should continue to be submitted to the Commission even 
aftertheCommunity financial aidhas been disbursedfully. 
tf this were soothe Commissionwould have access toa 
proper information system which it could use in its project 
managementand which would bearealtoolformonitoring 
the execution of the projects and evaluating their end 
resuk Pinally^ itshould becleartotherecipientsthat 
failure on their part to meet their obligations in this area 
could result in the Community'sreviewing its undertaking 
to provide financial aid. 
^B^^o^ 
4.39. Projects should be evaluated systematically during 
and at the end of implementation in order to assess the 
effectiveness ofthe Community aid^ size up the difficulties 
encountered^ apply the necessary corrective measures and 
draw any conclusions that maybeofbenefitforthe future. 
COnlyrecently^for the projects financed under the^fhird 
Protocols with the ^iaghreb and ^tashreq countries^ has 
the Commission begun to include provisions to that effect 
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Staff resources 
4.40. As a result of the delays which affect projects, there 
is very often a succession of people with responsibility for 
the implementation and monitoring of them within the 
various Commission departments concerned. The con-
sequence of that is that part of the information inevitably 
disappears with each person who leaves the department; 
each person tends to have only a partial knowledge of the 
project, confined to the phase with which he or she has been 
associated; if problems arise it is difficult to establish 
responsibilities. Because of the delays in finding replace-
ments, which sometimes takes several months, there is no 
continuity of monitoring. The high level of staff mobility 
makes it even more imperative that instructions be drawn 
up and adequate supervision established for the officials 
who are responsible for managing project files. 
4.41. Financial and technical cooperation is only one 
aspect of the agreements signed with the non-member 
countries of the Mediterranean area. The other main aspect 
is trade relations, which are even more important in the 
case of the Maghreb countries. Moreover, delays in 
implementing the Financial Protocols have also led to an 
accumulation of projects which are in the process of being 
carried out. There is no certainty that the Commission 
departments concerned will be able to carry out their 
responsibilities under adequate conditions in view of the 
increase in their workload, and the imminent conclusion of 
the Fourth Protocols with the Maghreb and Mashreq 
countries (in principle at the end of 1991) will only 
aggravate the situation. 
The role of the delegations 
4.42. The Commission delegations in the recipient 
countries are required to play an important part in the 
implementation of cooperation agreements, as it is they 
who provide the contact with local partners and maintain a 
direct dialogue with them. The delegations are not free of 
the weaknesses that have been mentioned above and the 
negative effect of the latter is aggravated by the geograp-
hical distances involved. In particular, it should be pointed 
out that there were no Commission instructions regarding 
the precise responsibilities conferred on the delegations, the 
form of monitoring they are to provide, or the nature of the 
information they are to provide and the frequency with 
which they are to provide it. 
4.43. In the absence of a reference framework, the quality 
of the delegation's monitoring of project implementation is 
very variable and largely dependent on the initiative and 
conscientiousness of the people in charge of the files. Egypt 
offers a very good illustration of this. The monitoring of the 
agricultural projects in that country was rather poor, until 
it was realized that there was a need for stricter control (see 
paragraph 4.25). As part of the effort which should be 
made to establish an adequate aid management system, to 
ensure that the central departments and the delegations 
work together and to increase the effectiveness of the 
projects, the Commission should pay particular attention 
to providing a clear definition of the delegations' 
responsibilities during the execution and monitoring of 
projects and should consider ways of checking the quality 
of their work. 
5. THE IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
OF FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL 
COOPERATION 
Audits by the Court 
5.1. The following section of the report is based 
particularly on the results of the audit work carried out by 
the Court between 1986 and 1990 (}). Table 5 provides an 
overview of the projects and measures audited by the 
Court, with the amount of aid granted for them by the 
Community. In total they represent a financial package 
amounting to slightly more than 500 Mio ECU, 55 % of 
the total budget finance for the Protocols concerned. 
5.2. The representativeness of the sample of projects and 
measures examined by the Court was, in fact, higher, as it is 
the state of budgetary implementation at the time of the 
audits, rather than the total financial package, that should 
be taken as the reference point. 
(
J) The Court made on-the-spot visits to the following countries: 
a) Egypt, first in September/October 1986 and again in 
January 1990; 
b) Jordan, October 1986; 
c) Malta, September/October 1987; 
d) Algeria, June 1988; 
e) Tunisia, November 1988; 
f) Morocco, October 1989. 
In the case of the projects financed in Turkey, a documentary 
audit was carried out at the Commission at the beginning of 
1990. The on-the-spot visits were preceded by a review of the 
files in the various Commission departments responsible. The 
visits including working meetings with the Commission 
delegations, discussions with representatives of national and 
local authorities, the organizations responsible for implement-
ing projects and technical assistance teams, as well as visits to 
the parts of financial projects that were already under way, and 
interviews with recipients (farmers, trainees, etc.). 26. 9. 91 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 252/19 
Table 5 — List of projects and measures audited by the Court on the spot or on the basis of documents 1986-1990 
TURKEY 
1. Karakaya hydroelectric complex 
2. Elbistan thermal power station 
3. Beypazari lignite mines 
4. Lignite-related prospecting 
Thrid 
Protocol 
{Mio ECU) 
85,0 
75,0 
160,0 
%of 
overall 
budget 
71 
Special aid 
(Mio ECU) 
22,0 
8,0 
30,0 
%of 
overall 
budget 
40 
MALTA 
5. Technical assistance and training programme 
6. Port of Valetta 
ALGERIA 
7. Establishment and extensions of vocational training 
centres 
8. Ministry of Commerce support 
9. Executive training in the public works sector 
10. Executive training for heavy industries 
MOROCCO 
11. National veterinary vaccine production laboratory 
12. Lexar lexicographical database 
13. Haouz Central improvement 
14. Institute of applied technology — vocational training 
15. Ait Chouarit dam 
16. Credit operation for the benefit of small farmers 
17. Sale slum clearance scheme 
Protocol 
(Mio ECU) 
4,60 
5,00 
9,60 
11,70 
2,20 
13,90 
2,36 
0,40 
16,00 
15,30 
34,06 
% of 
overall 
budget 
96 
31 
46 
Second 
Protocol 
(Mio ECU) 
-0) 
2,75 
4,00 
6,75 
19,00 
42,00 
26,56 
18,00 
105,56 
%of 
overall 
budget 
— 
15 
96 
(') At the time of the Court visit, the state of budgetary implementation did not merit audit. No C 252/20  Official Journal of the European Communities  26. 9. 91 
TUNISIA 
18. Establishment of vocational training centres 
19. Training scheme for the benefit of the Institut de 
financement et de developpement tuniso-algerien (IFID) 
20. Marine science research programme 
21. Agricultural loans scheme BNDA 
22. Technical assistance for the BNDA 
23. Finance for small and medium-sized agricultural and 
agroindustrial measures — global loans 
24. Finance for 10 trawlers BNDA 
25. Economic and technical survey for the establishment of 
date-palm groves in the Rejim-Maatoug region 
26. Technical assistance for the IFID 
27. Increased research capacity Water resources directorate 
Ministry of Agriculture 
28. Inventory of southern Tunisian soil resources 
29. Improvement of irrigation management 
EGYPT 
30. University cooperation 
31. Investment promotion 
32. Agency for the development of renewable energy sources, 
Egypt 
33. Helwan sewerage 
34. Agricultural storage at Daqahlia 
35. Sinai water resources studies 
36. University cooperation on marine sciences 
37. Fodder improvement 
38. Improvement of fodder production 
JORDAN 
39. Agricultural loan to small farmers — Agricultural Credit 
Corporation 
40. Jordan Valley Authority seedling production unit 
41. Assistance to the Royal Scientific Society 
42. Assistance to the Science Faculty of Yarmouk University 
43. Assistance to the Engineering and Technology Faculty of 
the University of Jordan 
First 
Protocol 
(Mio ECU) 
3,90 
0,23 
0,24 
4,37 
2,85 
2,00 
7,70 
32,04 
6,00 
2,08 
52,67 
3,70 
0,95 
0,98 
2,50 
6,68 
14,81 
% of 
overall 
budget 
8 
68 
67 
Second 
Protocol 
(Mio ECU) 
18,07 
0,67 
14,13 
3,02 
1,90 
0,27 
1,00 
0,40 
2,50 
41,96 
20,30 
4,00 
3,00 
3,00 
2,40 
1,30 
34,00 
1,66 
2,50 
4,16 
% of 
budget 
68 
27 
16 
Total budgetary aid for the projects/measures examined : 511,84 Mio ECU 
Total overall budget for the Protocols concerned : 942,00 Mio ECU 
Proportion of the overall budget examined : 55 % 26. 9. 91  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 252/21 
5.3. With the exception of Turkey, it was not possible to 
audit any projects financed under the Third Protocols, as 
implementation of them was only just beginning at that 
point. The Court did not carry out any audits of project 
financing in Lebanon because of the internal situation 
there, or in Syria, in view of the state of relations between 
the Community and that country. For similar reasons, 
financial and technical cooperation with these two 
countries was virtually at a standstill. As the Court stated in 
its Annual report concerning the financial year 1987 (
1), it 
was unable to carry out an on-the-spot audit in Cyprus 
because the Cypriot authorities refused permission for the 
audit, on the grounds that the EIB had opposed it. 
5.4. The observations made by the Court in this section of 
the report are concerned with the Protocols covering the 
projects audited. This therefore rules out the Third 
Protocols, with the exception of the Protocol with Turkey. 
The Court's observations and findings refer to the state of 
projects at the time of the audits. 
Budgetary implementation 
General observations 
5.5. Table 2 traces, by country and geographical area, the 
changes in the financial packages provided from budgetary 
resources in accordance with the provisions of the 
protocols, as well as the commitments entered into and the 
payments effected. These figures are illustrated by 
Graphs 4-18. Table 4 shows the position with regard to the 
utilization of the sums allocated and the execution of 
commitments at 31 December 1989. 
5.6. Overall, the rate of budgetary implementation of the 
Protocols is slow. As of 31 December 1989, commitments 
amounted to approximately 1 322,9 Mio ECU, 79,7 % of 
the total financial package; payments effected amounted to 
approximately 795,6 Mio ECU, or 47,9 % of the total and 
60,1 % of commitments entered into. 
5.7. In the case of the countries of the northern 
Mediterranean (Turkey, Cyprus and Malta), 95,4 % of the 
financial package had been committed and 82 % dis-
bursed. It must be remembered, however, that Turkey 
accounted for the major part of the finance available for 
this area (more than 80 %) and that it had been granted the 
aid in question around ten years earlier. 
(
J) OJ No C 316,12. 12. 1988, pp. 135-136, paragraphs 9.6 - 9.8. 
5.8. The sums allocated to the First and Second Protocols 
with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries were almost fully 
committed, with the exception of the First Protocol with 
Algeria. The payments effected represented 83,1 % of the 
total finance for the First Protocols, and 55,4 % of that for 
the Second Protocols. In the case of the Third Protocols, 
which took effect during 1988 and were therefore almost 
halfway through their period of implementation at the 
review date, commitments represented slightly less than 
half (46,8 %) the financial package; it should, however, be 
noted that the level of utilization was markedly higher for 
the Maghreb countries (65 %) than for the Mashreq 
countries (24 %). The payments were only just beginning 
then and amounted to only 2,8 % of the amount of the total 
financing and 5,9 % of the amount of commitments 
entered into. 
5.9. Taking the table showing the utilization of the 
various financial packages at the end of the period of 
application for each of the expired Protocols (see Table 3), 
it will be seen that a significant proportion had still not 
been committed at that point; the residue amounted to 
more than 20 % for the Maghreb and Mashreq countries as 
a whole and fluctuated between 30 % and almost 50 % in 
the cases of Algeria and Egypt. 
5.10. At the same dates, between 70 % and 80 % of the 
total finance allocated remained to be paid out, although 
the rate of payment was faster for certain countries, such as 
Cyprus, Malta (First Protocol), Morocco and Jordan. 
Thus, as can be seen from Table 2 and Graphs 4-18, in the 
case of these countries it takes about five to eight years to 
disburse the financial package for a given Protocol; for the 
other countries, and Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria in 
particular, the rate of payments is so slow that it sometimes 
takes more than ten years. The observed variations are the 
result of the particular, and highly dissimilar, situations 
within each of these countries (see paragraphs 5.12 — 
5.19). 
5.11. The Community global guarantee for loans granted 
by the EIB from its own resources to the ten countries 
discussed in this report (see Annex 2, paragraph 6) 
represented around 789,7 Mio ECU at 31 December 1990, 
which was the full amount of loans granted. The guarantee 
has been invoked on several occasions since 1988, to cover 
obligations that Lebanon and Syria were unable to meet. As 
at 31 December 1990 the total amount for payments 
effected in this way from the general budget was around 
21,6 Mio ECU; Lebanon and Syria have already repaid 
some 8,3 Mio ECU of this total. 
Turkey 
5.12. Following the coup d'etat in Turkey in September 
1980, the Commission froze the residual 29 Mio ECU of 
special aid, which then remained frozen until 1986 (see 
Table 2 and Graph 4). In certain cases the implementation 
of projects that had been approved before the freeze was No C 252/22  Official Journal of the European Communities  26. 9. 91 
also affected; the start of the Beypazari lignite mines 
project was delayed by two years because a parallel 
technical assistance and training project was held up. On 
account of the human rights situation and the Cypriot 
problem, the Fourth Protocol, which was initialled in June 
1981, has still not been sent to the Council. 
Malta 
5.13. The relative speed with which the First Protocol 
with Malta was implemented (see Table 2 and Graph 6) 
was due to the fact that the Community financial aid had 
been granted for measures which were already substan-
tially under way, not to say completed. It was a matter of 
reimbursing expenditure which was deemed to be eligible 
and could be identified and examined very quickly. There 
was a marked difference in the case of the Second Protocol: 
the overall budget was indeed committed in full over a 
period of two years, but the payments did not begin to filter 
through until 1989. 
Algeria 
5.14. The implementation of the First and Second 
Protocols with Algeria was marked by particularly serious 
delays (see Table 2 and Graph 8) due to a combination of 
adverse circumstances. Algeria's relative prosperity at the 
start of the 1980s, the policies pursued by that country, 
which to some extent closed it to the outside world, and the 
fact that the amount of Community aid was deemed to be 
minimal resulted during that period in a certain lack of 
interest in financial and technical cooperation with the 
Community on the part of the Algerian authorities. 
Difficulties were encountered in defining the objectives of 
such cooperation and identifying the actual measures and 
projects to be financed. In the case of the first two 
Protocols, the programming exercise required several 
years. The implementation of projects then came up 
against other difficulties in the form of administrative 
procedures; the national authorizing officer proved to be 
weak and inefficient; the Algerian government's refusal to 
change its customary procedures in order to comply with 
the Community tendering procedures also proved to be a 
major obstacle. 
Morocco 
5.15. The higher rate of implementation that was 
observed in the case of Morocco (see Table 2 and Graph 9) 
was due to that country's interest in Community financial 
aid which, admittedly, was more substantial. The author-
ities responsible for implementing the projects were 
generally competent and efficient. The particularly rapid 
rate of payments in the case of the Second Protocol was also 
due, however, to the special nature of these payments: in 
some cases they represent advance payments and in others 
fast, global transfers of finance which are reflected in 
accounting entries, but not in progress on the ground; there 
were also instances where the Community financial 
contribution was granted for the execution of works that 
were already substantially under way. 
Tunisia 
5.16. The rate of execution for financial and technical 
cooperation with Tunisia was middling. Up to 1985 there 
was a considerable delay in implementing the Second 
Protocol (see Table 2 and Graph 10) due to the nature of 
the projects and measures financed (agricultural sector) 
and to the change of national authorizing officer at the end 
of 1983. The rate has speeded up since then. 
Egypt 
5.17. In the case of Egypt (see Table 2 and Graph 12), the 
projects were particularly late in starting up, owing to the 
phases prior to execution. This was due to the time taken to 
produce the project profiles, define the components 
precisely, examine and approve them, sign the financing 
agreement and select contractors at the end of the tendering 
procedures. Very often it was three years before projects 
could start. Implementation of them then encountered a 
number of constraints, not least of which were the 
cumbersome national bureaucracies, the inertia which 
damaged the projects' chances of success and the lack of 
capacity, particularly in terms of financial and human 
resources, within the bodies responsible for executing these 
projects and measures. 
Jordan 
5.18. The rate of implementation was considered to be 
satisfactory in the case of Jordan (see Table 2 and 
Graph 13). The general climate was more favourable as, in 
the first half of the 1980s, Jordan was a relatively wealthy 
country, with a relatively high level of education and 
training among the population. Community financial aid 
was concentrated on a fairly small number of projects in the 
field of vocational and university training and agricultural 
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Lebanon 
5.19. The implementation of the Protocols with Lebanon 
has been held up by the civil war in that country (see 
Table 2 and Graph 14). This applies particularly in the case 
of the Second Protocol which, even though the overall 
budget has been committed in full, had not resulted in any 
kind of achievement on the ground for several years, and 
also in the case of the Third Protocol, for which no 
commitments had yet been entered into. 
Project conception 
5.20. Project conception is a key factor in the satisfactory 
execution and effective utilization of Community funds. 
The audits carried out by the Court showed up a number of 
weaknesses in the conception of the projects examined 
which had negative repercussions when the projects were 
carried out. 
Project environment and objectives 
5.21. The decision to finance a project or measure is 
sometimes open to criticism because it fails to take account 
of an unfavourable environment which considerably 
impedes the attainment of the socio-economic objectives 
from the outset. 
5.22. In Egypt some of the agricultural development 
projects were practically doomed to failure from the 
moment they were launched because of controls on farm 
prices and the subsidies paid on certain foodstuffs. 
Advisory measures presuppose an existing network of 
cooperatives or advisory services, but, in fact, they did not 
exist or were inoperative. It was impossible to make 
optimum use of some investments because of supply quotas 
on the raw materials. 
5.23. In Morocco the production and marketing of 
certain veterinary products was stymied by a price-fixing 
system which promoted the distribution of imported 
products, even though they were more expensive. 
Local partners 
5.24. In Egypt, agricultural projects which were primarily 
targeted on development, advisory and/or distributional 
measures had been placed with research institutes which 
did not have the resources to carry them out successfully. 
5.25. In Tunisia, the organization responsible did not, at 
the time when the agricultural loan operations were 
launched, have the local structure that was necessary for 
fast and efficient implementation of the system of loans for 
promoting the development of small and medium-sized 
agricultural holdings. 
5.26. In Algeria the problem was more general, because 
the national authorizing body did not perform the 
functions expected of it (see paragraph 5.14). Due to the 
small number of staff, who had very little training for work 
of this kind, the organization was unable to manage the 
development aid funds correctly. It did not have the power 
to exert a positive influence on the progress of measures 
and was unable to mediate between the various govern-
ment departments. The effects of this weakness were 
particularly apparent in the management of projects. 
Finance plans 
5.27. Community financial aid was sometimes granted 
for projects for which no clear financing plan had been 
established, or even where there was no adequate guarantee 
that all the necessary resources would be obtained. 
5.28. In Turkey, the Community contribution was 
granted for a project that was already under way, in order 
to make good some of the shortage of funds that had arisen 
in the financing plan because of delays in carrying it out; 
the financing proposal mentioned contributions from other 
sources of funds, but said nothing about the amount. 
5.29. In Morocco, the Commission and the EIB were 
cofinancing a project on the basis of their respective 
estimates of the expected cost, which differed by around 
21 Mio ECU and for which the financing was, ultimately, 
far from assured. 
5.30. The drafting of the financing agreements should be 
tighter, more precise and more realistic and the agreements 
should be used as the basic reference document for the 
implement of the project and the evaluation of its results. 
Implementation timetables 
5.31. The financing agreements generally only mentioned 
an overall duration or a final completion date, without 
going into great detail. The projects often included 
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assistance, construction work, etc.), but the programming 
of timetables that is needed for efficient coordination of 
measures did not exist. 
5.32. In most cases the schedules were unrealistic and, for 
that reason, rarely respected. They assumed that the 
conditions under which they were to be implemented were 
ideal, whereas such conditions are far from prevalent in 
countries like those where the projects are financed; the 
limitations in question are, however, widely known 
(procedural problems, weakness of government depart-
ments, shortage of human and financial resources, etc.), 
especially to the Commission. These factors should be 
taken into account when the projects are being defined, 
since failure to do so jeopardizes the viability of the 
financing plans, makes it difficult for management to plan 
ahead (planning operations, budget forecasting, etc.) and 
deprives it of a reliable reference point on which to base a 
correct evaluation of the difficulties encountered, correct-
ive action to be taken, progress made and results achieved. 
The necessity of drawing up a tight, realistic schedule is 
underlined by the provisions concerning the deadline for 
implementation of contractual obligations, which were 
introduced by Council Regulation (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) 
No 2049/88 of 24 June 1988 (*). 
The Community resources committed 
5.33. In some cases Community resources were commit-
ted in quantitites that were clearly (to the Commission, 
especially) substantially in excess of the requirements for 
the projects concerned. As a result of this practice 
Community aid was being tied up needlessly, sometimes 
for many years. 
5.34. In Morocco, some 4,3 Mio ECU were committed 
for a project, unnecessarily, because the Commission had 
omitted to take into account the weakening of the 
Moroccan currency and the Moroccan authorities' deci-
sion to take over the works which were, initially, to have 
been financed by the Community. In another case, the 
Community contribution was made on the basis of unduly 
pessimistic financial estimates, which however provided 
the justification for transferring to that project the entire 
24 Mio ECU originally earmarked for another project; in 
fact, the real cost of the operation was around 20 % below 
the forecasts and the Community, which was to have met 
approximately 70 % of the cost of the project, financed 
virtually all of it. 
5.35. In the case of a project in Egypt, the Commission 
knew for certain when the financing agreement was signed 
that the commitment exceeded the cost of the works by 
around 1,3 Mio ECU: the contract for the works had 
already been signed several months before. 
(!) OJ No L 185, 15. 7. 1988, p. 3, Article 1(1). 
The form of aid chosen 
5.36. The Court found in the case of a number of projects 
in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Malta that the financing 
made use of several, if not all, of the instruments provided 
for in the Protocols (subsidies, loans on special terms, loans 
by the EIB from its own resources and interest subsidies), 
without clearly stating the grounds on which a particular 
choice had been made, whether the nature, the repayment 
period or the profitability forecasts for the proposed 
investment. 
Execution of projects 
Delays 
5.37. A majority of projects were experiencing substan-
tial delays, of several years, both before they started and 
during execution. For example, mention may be made, 
without making an exhaustive list of cases, of the 
following, starting with the Elbistan power station 
(Turkey), which was to come on-stream in 1983, whereas it 
took until the end of 1989 — nine years after the finance 
was granted — for the loan on special terms to be disbursed 
in full. A further two years were required, after the 
conclusion of the work, before the installations at the 
National laboratory for the production of veterinary 
vaccines (Morocco) began to be used. Even though the Ait 
Chouarit and Sidi Driss dams and the Canal de Rocade 
(Morocco) were completed by the deadlines, there will 
have been a delay of ten years, at least, before the objectives 
of the hydro-agricultural refurbishment projects are 
achieved. Work on the first stage of the Helwan (Egypt) 
sewerage project began at the end of 1986, two years after 
the date when it was, theoretically, to have been 
completed; work on the second stage was supposed to start 
at the end of 1989 and was already, at the very least, one 
year behind schedule. The promotional and advisory work 
for the Fodder improvement project (Egypt) had barely 
started when the technical assistants left the project. The 
Agricultural Loans — BNDA (Tunisia) project was to have 
been completed by the end of 1988; as of that date less than 
half the aid had been utilized. The start of the irrigation 
management improvement project (Tunisia) was affected 
by serious delays. It had taken something like ten years to 
finish the Creation and extension of vocational training 
centres project (Algeria), which was scheduled to last four 
years. 
5.38. The implementation of projects may, of course, be 
affected by unexpected constraints, which cannot easily be 
foreseen. In the majority of cases, however, the delays are 
always due to the same familiar causes, including the 
slowness of procedures, defective administrative struc-
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and financial resources. It is this environment, which is so 
unconducive to unimpeded implementation of projects, 
that ought to be taken into account at the planning stage. 
Major project modifications 
5.39. It was not unusual for there to be radical changes in 
the content, or even the general direction, of projects 
during implementation, without any advance review being 
carried out to demonstrate the need and justification for 
such changes in terms of the environment, resources or 
objectives. On occasion, these changes were made simply at 
the initiative of the organization which was implementing 
the project, without the Commission being either informed 
or consulted. 
5.40. In Turkey, the Turkish partner doubled the 
production objective shortly after one project started; the 
volume of investment needed was virtually tripled, and 
whereas the Community was to be the only promoter in the 
beginning, other sources of finance were called upon. The 
Commission files do not contain any details of the 
circumstances which led to the modification. 
5.41. In Egypt, a series of substantial changes were made 
to a storage installation construction project, with the 
delegation's assent, but without the Commission's agree-
ment. There was such a lack of transparency, that, when it 
came to the financial preparations for the second phase, the 
Commission department responsible had to enquire as to 
the nature of the work that had been done during the first 
phase. There was no improvement in the situation during 
the second phase, when the Court and the delegation 
discovered in the course of their visits that the recipient was 
using the Community funds as he liked, without any regard 
for the financing agreement. Owing to the fact that no 
reliable research had been done, one project for the 
provision of advisory services and the development of 
fodder production embarked upon an experimental 
programme, without the project's aims being redefined 
beforehand. 
5.42. In Tunisia, a project to finance ten trawlers was 
defined in terms of a type of fishing that was tending 
towards industrial-scale operations. The loan was granted 
on special terms (broad mandate) and afterwards the EIB 
was informed that the specification for the trawlers was 
different from that which had been adopted at the time of 
the preliminary study. The change was not questioned, 
even though as a result Community aid was going to 
finance an increase in traditional-style fishing, and, in the 
medium or long term, the project was likely to be contrary 
to the interests of Tunisia's development. 
5.43. As regards the programme for middle management 
training in the civil engineering sector in Algeria, the 
financing agreement, which was signed more than two 
years after the Commission decision, was substantially 
different from the initial project. For example, the aim was 
no longer to retrain middle management; instead, training 
staff were to be trained in technical institutions. From this 
new standpoint, the measures to be carried out in the form 
of scholarships and technical assistance had been substan-
tially revised. 
Technical assistance 
5.44. The quality of the benefits provided by technical 
assistance financed by the Community can be affected by 
various factors, such as the quality of the experts 
themselves, lack of coordination of the technical assistance 
with the other components of the project or, occasionally, 
difficult working relations between the experts and the 
local supervisory staff. 
5.45. In Egypt, the quality of the experts could be queried 
in the first stage of a study of the water resources of the 
Sinai peninsula: it resulted in a general lack of information 
and documentation on the work carried out and the results 
obtained. 
5.46. In Tunisia, a project for the improvement of the 
management of irrigated areas was hampered by frequent 
changes of experts, whose work, and their reports in 
particular, were of poor quality. 
5.47. In the case of several projects in Algeria and Egypt, 
the technical assistance was used prematurely in view of the 
progress of the other components of the projects (construc-
tion work, materials purchasing) and the benefits derived 
by the projects were accordingly reduced. 
5.48. In one project for the improvement of fodder 
production in Egypt, the relations between the experts and 
their local counterparts suffered from a difference of 
opinion on the very orientation of the project and a lack of 
coordination. In one university cooperation programme, 
the personal relations were so bad that there was total 
disagreement on the approach to the work and how to 
carry it out; this led to the resignation of the British head of 
the projects, though it did not solve the problems. 
Recipients' commitments 
5.49. Recipients often do not comply at all with the 
commitments which they give in the financing agreements 
or often do so only after extended delays. The same may be 
said of their providing their financial contribution, making 
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providing the administrative structures planned for the 
execution of the project, or even observing the Community 
procedures for tendering and awarding contracts. Such 
omissions cause substantial delays and jeopardize the 
achievement of the objectives and occasionally even the 
whole approach to the project. 
5.50. In a slum clearance project in Morocco, the 
establishment of the socio-administrative structures, and of 
the medical and school infrastructures in particular, was 
significantly behind schedule and there was reason to doubt 
the sincerity of the Moroccan party's professed intention to 
carry them out (see paragraph 5.65). Community aid for a 
credit operation on behalf of small farmers was supposed 
to be managed separately but these provisions were not 
being respected. 
5.51. A vocational training programme in Algeria mainly 
suffered from failure to comply with the agreed procedures 
for tendering and award of contract. Having been informed 
after the event, the Commission was prevailed on to agree 
to multiple derogations. 
5.52. In Egypt, the benefiuary in a project for the 
construction of storage installations decided what work 
was to be done in the light of its own strategy, rather than in 
accordance with the financing agreement. Another project 
was being delayed by the inability of the Egyptian partner 
to make its financial contribution available in good time; 
the Commission has even agreed advances which have not 
been repaid. The non-availability of a few hectares of 
desert site in a country with 750 000 km
2 of surface area, 
96 % of which is desert, is an essential factor in the failure 
to carry out a large part of a research programme on soil 
improvement. In spite of continual reminders from the 
delegation, the structure planned and needed to ensure the 
operation, maintenance and management of a major water 
treatment system has still not been set up. 
Administrative structures 
5.53. The implementation of projects often suffers 
because there are too few staff, staff training is inadequate, 
and the staff themselves are undermotivated or subject to 
frequent transfers. Lack of coordination between the 
various parties concerned, both local and foreign, is also 
frequently observed. These findings apply to a number of 
projects in agricultural development, vocational training or 
research in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. 
Effectiveness of projects 
General observations 
5.54. The effectiveness of financial and technical cooper-
ation varies considerably from one country to another, and 
a separate analysis should therefore be made of each. In 
substance, the effects of projects financed in Jordan and 
Tunisia generally give cause for satisfaction. In Morocco, 
the implementation of the projects has not generally run 
into any particular obstacles and some are clearly 
successful; others, which are far from the least significant 
in financial terms, show that the achievement of the 
objectives has been considerably delayed, or even jeop-
ardized, because the measures for which the Moroccan 
party is responsible have not been executed as planned or 
risk never being executed. There is no doubt as to the 
effectiveness of the projects financed in Malta; there was, 
however, no concept of cooperation, the Community aid 
being confined to financing operations which were 
practically completed. The implementation of projects in 
Egypt is extremely laborious, mainly due to the shortcom-
ings of the local partners; in terms of results, failure, if not a 
fact, is often to be feared. Financial and technical 
cooperation with Algeria has been hit by a particularly 
adverse context which has hampered implementation to 
the extent that no results can be expected at this stage. A 
check on records at the Commission does not allow the 
effectiveness of Community aid to Turkey to be assessed, 
for lack of the necessary information. 
Turkey 
5.55. The inadequacy, or lack, of information in the 
Commission's files does not allow any documentary 
evaluation of whether the four projects which were 
examined and which accounted for total financial aid of 
190 Mio ECU, or nearly 65 % of the overall budgetary 
package for the Third Protocol and the special aid, 
achieved their objective of contributing to increasing 
electric power production. In the case of the two projects 
administered under a broad mandate by the EIB, i.e. the 
Karakaya Hydroelectric Complex and the Elbistan Power 
Station, it is not even possible to determine what exactly the 
160 Mio ECU of budgetary aid was used to finance. The 
two projects managed by the Commission, the Beypazari 
Lignite Mines and Lignite prospecting, did not go beyond 
the supply of equipment for the latter and the development 
objective was disregarded. 26. 9. 91  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 252/27 
Malta 
5.56. Generally speaking, the projects covered by the 
First Protocol met justified needs, were implemented 
satisfactorily and produced the expected effects. The 
technical assistance and training measures were generally 
of high quality and satisfied the Maltese agencies. The 
modernization work on the port of Valetta went ahead 
without a hitch and the profitability of the investment 
seems guaranteed. However, there was no evidence of the 
very idea of cooperation in the application of the First 
Protocol. It amounted in fact to straightforward financial 
aid for measures which were far advanced, if not 
completed. 
Algeria 
5.57. One of the priorities set for the first two Protocols 
was, after the reduction of the food deficit, meeting the 
considerable requirements in terms of training of man-
agerial staff and skilled labour necessary to achieve the 
economic and social development objectives; there is no 
doubt that Community aid in these areas has been useful. 
Its implementation, however, occasionally meets substan-
tial difficulties. The general context has, until very recently 
in any case, been particularly unfavourable, as manifested 
in the Algerian authorities' lack of interest in Community 
aid (see paragraph 5.14). The low rate of budgetary 
implementation illustrates this (see Table 4). In these 
circumstances, it is difficult to expect tangible results as 
things stand at present. 
5.58. It has taken about ten years to complete the project 
for the creation and extension of vocational training 
centres, which was planned to last three or four years. It is 
impossible to evaluate the impact of the Community 
expenditure for that part which had been carried out when 
the Court carried out its audit; in any case, it is doubtful 
that the objective was achieved in terms of creating training 
posts for the various sectors of construction and industry. 
The human resources mobilized by this project and the 
difficulties encountered were out of all proportion to its 
effects. 
5.59. The project in support of the Commerce Ministry, 
launched in 1987 and intended to provide training 
measures which would allow the export capacity of 
Algerian undertakings to be developed, cannot be carried 
out because the Algerian party itself and the Commission 
are unable to define the nature of the aid which the 
Community is supposed to provide. The changes which 
have taken place in the Algerian economic landscape call 
for a review of the conclusions of the study on which the 
project is based, but the Algerian authorities are not in a 
position to draw up a specific request. 
5.60. In spite of a long appraisal period (three and a half 
years), the financing agreement for the project for training 
managerial staff from the public works sector does not 
contain the elements necessary for the project to be carried 
out. In particular, it makes no mention of the schedule for 
the execution of the various measures and it does not define 
the nature of the technical assistance contemplated. 
Algerian students are following, or have followed, training 
programmes in the Community, although there is no means 
of ensuring that the grants awarded fit within the 
framework of the project. In the absence of any technical 
assistance, which is preventing the project from getting off 
the ground, it is doubtful that the recipients of grants, once 
trained, will carry out training duties in the bodies covered 
by the project. 
5.61. The seminars which have already been organized in 
the context of the project for training managers in heavy 
industry seem to have lived up to the Algerian party's 
expectations as regards the transfer of know-how. It will, 
however, be difficult to evaluate the impact of the project, 
because the financing agreement makes no attempt to 
define the measures to be carried out in anything other than 
monetary terms. 
Morocco 
5.62. By comparison with what is observed in other 
countries, the actual realization of the projects in Morocco 
gives ground for relative satisfaction. Nevertheless, while 
several of the projects examined are clearly successful (see 
paragraphs 5.68 — 5.69), certain others are not, par-
ticularly the project for a credit operation on behalf of 
small farmers, the exact use made of the Community funds 
for which remains unknown (see paragraph 5.63). The 
other projects, the usefulness of which is not contested, will 
be able to achieve their objectives fully only if the 
Moroccan authorities ensure that the measures for which 
they are responsible are carried out (see paragraphs 5.65— 
5.67). 
5.63. The credit operation on behalf of small farmers 
financed the rescheduling of the debts of around 70 000 far-
mers with financial difficulties due to repeated droughts. In 
the absence of any information on the collection of these 
debts, it is impossible to know whether this measure 
produced lasting effects: some information obtained by the 
Court gives grounds for doubt, at least where certain 
regions which have continued to suffer adverse weather 
conditions are concerned. The Caisse Nationale de Credit 
Agricole has not kept to its undertaking to manage 
operations linked to the credit line funded by the 
Community separately; there is therefore no means of 
checking that the funds recovered since 1985 have 
effectively been re-used for similar operations or for 
granting loans to small farmers on the most favourable 
terms. The Commission is largely responsible for this state 
of affairs since, once the Community contribution was paid 
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5.64. The LEXAR lexicographical database project was 
used to prepare a computerized dictionary of scientific and 
technical terms. However, this database cannot be used for 
the present, no works have been published, nor have any 
computer access networks been set up. 
5.65. The development work for.the Sale slum clearance 
project is going ahead relatively satisfactorily and, at this 
stage, three of the four shanty towns have been cleared. The 
relocation of the families to the prepared plots and the 
programme for the construction of individual housing seem 
to be making normal progress. The considerable delay in 
providing the socio-administrative facilities, which are the 
responsibility of the Moroccan party, does however 
encourage the fear that, now that the land occupied by the 
slums has been practically cleared, the Moroccan author-
ities have lost interest in this operation; the relocated 
families would thus once more be isolated in an area with 
none of the necessary medical, school or commercial 
infrastructures. 
5.66. This provides one further example of lack of 
monitoring by the Commission, which is all the more 
regrettable since, when the project was approved, in view 
of the importance of the socio-economic aspects of the 
operation, the ad hoc committee expressly asked the 
Commission to take particular care to monitor its 
execution. 
5.67. With the Development of the Haouz Central and 
Ait Chouarit Dam projects, the Community took part in 
the realization of the heavy infrastructures necessary for a 
valid and ambitious development plan which was supposed 
to allow more efficient and economic water use and an 
increase in foodstuffs production. For technical and 
financial reasons, however, the schedule for the execution 
of the Haouz development plan is in disarray and the 
infrastructures which the Community played a part in 
financing are, with the exception of the Marrakech 
drinking water supply, not as yet being used for the 
intended purposes. If the uncertainties threatening more 
than one half of the planned irrigation network are 
removed and if the hydro-agricultural developments 
progress at the desired rate, something which has not been 
observed to date, the first stage of the irrigation of the 
Haouz plain will at best be complete ten years behind the 
initial schedule. Here again, the Commission's monitoring 
was insufficient because it was confined solely to the civil 
engineering work and ended when that was completed in 
1986. 
5.68. In spite of a two-year delay in the commissioning of 
the installations, the national veterinary vaccine produc-
tion laboratory has achieved its aims as regards staff 
training and the production of vaccines against diseases of 
sheep. The laboratory offers quality products along with 
the speed and flexibility needed for effective vaccination 
campaigns. For the moment, the production of fowlpox 
vaccines is being hampered by a price fixing system which 
encourages the distribution of imported products. Greater 
autonomy of management ought soon to allow the 
laboratory to develop its activities, particularly towards the 
private sector. The Commission's monitoring has been 
satisfactory; a project evaluation study was even carried 
out at its request by a consultant. 
5.69. There is every indication that the projects to train 
staff for and to equip ten institutes of applied technology/ 
vocational training are achieving their aim of providing the 
Moroccan economy with the technical staff it needs, 
mainly in the industrial, building, public works, commer-
cial and general services sectors. With a few exceptions, the 
training programmes have started as planned and the 
attendance rate at the centres is satisfactory. The trained 
technicians do, however, have difficulties in finding a job 
outside the most developed and industrialized areas of the 
country. 
Tunisia 
5.70. In spite of certain extrinsic difficulties in implemen-
tation, financial and technical cooperation with Tunisia 
has proved to be positive overall. Some reserves may be 
expressed on the possible outcome of certain projects (see 
paragraphs 5.71 — 5.73), but, otherwise, the Community's 
financial intervention has achieved the aims laid down (see 
paragraphs 5.74 — 5.76). 
5.71. The project for the creation of vocational training 
centres suffered from a lack of coordination, and one of the 
three centres built has proved unsuited to the type of 
teaching which was aimed at. The premature withdrawal 
of the technical assistance financed by the Community 
reduced the project to the supply of equipment. 
5.72. As a result of the scaling-down of the vessels (see 
paragraph 5.42), it is doubtful that the project to finance 
ten trawlers can allow the expected increase in industrial 
fishing which had provided the grounds for Community 
intervention. 
5.73. At the time of the audit, it was too early to try to 
assess the results of the projects for an agricultural credit 
operation and for financing small and medium-scale 
agricultural and agro-industrial initiatives by global loans. 
In fact, however, particularly due to the repeated droughts, 
many loans have had to be rescheduled and may even be 
irrecoverable. The risk of a drain on the working capital 
constituted by the Community aid cannot be ruled out. 
5.74. The technico-economic study of the creation of 
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promising development prospects; an initial plan, financed 
by the Community (15 Mio ECU), provides for the 
development of around 1 000 hectares to allow popu-
lations to be established in these regions and production to 
be developed for which considerable outlets exist. 
5.75. The project to develop the research capacity of the 
Directorate of Water Resources of the Ministry for 
Agriculture seems to have achieved its objectives of 
contributing to better management of the resources 
mobilized and to the pursuit of research for mobilizing new 
ones. It constitutes a fundamental basis for precise 
evaluation of water potential and its use, especially for the 
extension of irrigated surfaces. 
5.76. The project for an inventory of soil resources in 
southern Tunisia has allowed maps to be drawn up, sectors 
with potential for agro-pastoral development to be located 
and detailed pedological studies to be carried out, which 
ought to provide an incentive to start up the agricultural 
development projects which are part of the national 
strategy to combat desertification. 
Egypt 
5.77. A considerable number of projects examined failed 
to achieve their objectives. For some, it is hard to establish 
the nature of the activities being carried on (see para-
graphs 5.78 — 5.81). For others, the impact of Community 
aid is doubtful owing to the inability of the Egyptian 
partner to make effective use of the installations which 
were financed (paragraphs 5.82 — 5.85). One of the 
projects examined, which is not yet complete, seems to 
offer encouraging prospects (see paragraph 5.85). 
5.78. Almost half of the measures provided for in the 
investment promotion programme had to be abandoned 
because of the mediocre services provided by the Egyptian 
agency which was responsible. In the absence of any 
activity report, in spite of the Commission's repeated 
requests, the results of the measures undertaken are hard to 
establish; some ten Community firms have reportedly set 
up some activity in Egypt. 
5.79. The first stage of the study on water resources in the 
Sinai peninsula was seriously affected by a whole set of 
hindrances, not the least of which were the weakness of the 
technical assistance, the lack of human resources, delays in 
the delivery of equipment, lack of coordination and 
programming of work and insufficient monitoring on the 
Commission's part. Although it is too early to venture an 
opinion on the possible outcome of the second stage, it is 
starting up on more promising terms, since it would seem 
that lessons have been learned from the past weaknesses. 
5.80. A real systematic study programme has yet to be set 
up for the marine biology research project under the 
university cooperation programme. The strained relations 
between the staff of the faculty (see paragraph 5.48) make 
it difficult to recruit students. There is also a risk that 
getting the studies under way will be further hampered by 
the relocation of the research station to a site which has 
neither easy access nor any of the facilities required. 
5.81. With the exception of a necessarily modest 
experimental programme launched by the technical 
assistance, the project for the improvement of fodder 
production has had no effect other than to finance the 
normal operation of the department of the research 
institute concerned and the purchase of equipment which 
has not been used and probably cannot be used. It is clear 
that the project will not allow the dissemination of 
improved fodder timetables that are better suited to the 
farmers' needs. 
5.82. The project for the improvement of livestock fodder 
was limited to an investment and construction phase but 
did not allow any improved fodder techniques to be made 
available to small farmers. The production and distri-
bution capacities built remain considerably under-used. 
The advisory work has not even started. The gradual 
deregulation of the agricultural sector since 1988, which 
ought to lead to the abolition of subsidies for traditional 
animal feeds, may hold some interesting prospects for this 
project after it has been completed. The installations 
financed can be put to valid use so long as their 
management is entrusted to an efficient, motivated body, 
which hitherto has not been the case. 
5.83. The first stage of the agricultural storage project in 
Daqahlia permitted the construction of necessary good-
quality warehouses which met the requirements. Their 
maintenance, however, is liable to cause concern sooner or 
later. More fundamentally, in the current circumstances 
these buildings cannot play a part in achieving the aim of 
reducing storage losses of foodstuffs; the warehouses 
visited by the Court all held fertilizers in plastic sacks, while 
the rice, in jute sacks, was stored in the open, without 
adequate protection. The beginnings of the second phase 
would seem to prove that the Egyptian agency uses 
Community funds as it sees fit. Thus, without consulting 
the Commission beforehand, it has decided to substantially 
amend the nature and location of the warehouses to be 
built, and it remains to be seen whether, unlike those 
already built, they will in fact be used for storing foodstuffs. 
5.84. The Helwan sewerage project is complex and 
highly technical. The delay in the definition and appraisal 
of the project has led to considerable financial drift; 
15 Mio ECU of Community subsidy under the Second 
Protocol will, moreover, only serve to bring the costs back 
up to date, without financing any additional physical 
investment. Thanks in particular to considerable technical 
aid, the main technical problems have been solved and the No C 252/30  Official Journal of the European Communities  26. 9. 91 
system ought to be able to function once the work is 
completed. The long-term viability of the system is not, 
however, guaranteed; in spite of the Commission's 
repeated interventions in recent years, the Egyptian 
authorities have still not set up the administrative and 
technical structures necessary to ensure the management, 
functioning and maintenance of the system. The agency 
which is responsible is not even in a position to operate and 
maintain the existing system correctly. For lack of 
appropriate provisions, which ought to have been defined 
at the time when the project was identified, there is a real 
risk that this state-of-the art treatment system will fall into 
disrepair. 
5.85. The research project on breeding 'Artemia' shrimps 
under the university cooperation programme has still not 
overcome all the technical or economic obstacles. The 
experts think, however, that the conditions exist in Egypt 
to allow commercial production, for which outlets exist, of 
these shrimps, which constitute an essential element for 
feeding young fry. 
Jordan 
5.86. The implementation of the projects financed in 
Jordan generally calls for no criticism. The investment 
carried out plays a part in attaining the objectives set (see 
paragraphs 5.90 — 5.91), even though it may be observed 
that some are, perhaps temporarily, under-used (see 
paragraphs 5.88 — 5.89). One project elicits reservations, 
however, but its possible effectiveness is less in question 
than its design (see paragraph 5.87). 
5.87. The project for Agricultural Credit for small 
farmers raises some questions and some reservations. In 
view of the different conditions (grace period, repayment 
term and rate of interest) which accompany Community 
multi-stage loans to the state of Jordan, then from the latter 
to the Agricultural Credit Corporation and finally from the 
latter to the farmers, the financial advantages obtained by 
Community aid are divided between the State, the credit 
agency and the farmers. The project in fact hides a triple 
operation, which is the Agricultural Credit Corporation's 
financing of small agricultural projects, the increase of this 
body's working capital and the government's financing of 
small agricultural projects. This system is open to criticism 
first and foremost for lack of transparency because the aims 
of financing are not clearly defined. Moreover, this 
financial arrangement does not allow adequate control of 
the utilization of the funds. 
5.88. In the case of the project concerning assistance to 
the Royal Scientific Society, the fitting-out of the 
laboratories, the training measures, the transfer of know-
how and the provision of experts were carried out to the 
satisfaction of the recipients. At the time of the Court's 
audit, however, the equipment installed for a solar energy 
research sub-project seemed to be all but unused, in 
particular due to an apparent lack of interest on the part of 
the Community partner, the Joint Research Centre at Ispra. 
5.89. There was some delay in the execution of the 
project for assistance to the Engineering and Technology 
Faculty of the University of Jordan, but the work on 
building and fitting out the laboratories and the technical 
assistance work have finally all been satisfactorily 
completed. The objectives of the project have been 
achieved, although it has to be observed that the 
educational ambitions of the establishment appear modest 
by comparison with the equipment supplied. 
5.90. There have been problems in implementing the 
Project for the Jordan Valley Authority seedling produc-
tion Unit, due to a lack of coordination and a technical 
design error in the seedling irrigation process. Once the 
necessary modifications are carried out, the installations 
will allow the intensive seedling production necessary for 
the agricultural development of the Jordan valley. 
5.91. The project to provide assistance to the Science 
Faculty of the University of Yarmouk has been a success. 
Modern, high-quality equipment is being used and 
adequately maintained. The University is also turning to 
the industrial sector and offering its study and research 
services, thus promoting the development of relations 
between research activities and the industries which will 
use new advances in technology, something that is always 
desirable. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
6.1. There is an element of rigidity in the Financial 
Protocols, compared with the great diversity of situations 
to be met with on the ground, which means in particular 
that the rates of execution vary greatly between the 
recipient countries. Nevertheless, in principle, they offer an 
appropriate framework for defining and implementing a 
form of financial and technical cooperation which will be 
consistent, both over time and with the partner countries' 
priority development objectives (see paragraphs 3.23 — 
3.31). 
6.2. However, the numerous difficulties experienced in 
their implementation and the possibility that was thus left 
open of committing Community funds for an unlimited 
duration largely made nonsense of the multiannual 
framework within which they were conceived. The result 
was that the rate of budgetary implementation was slow 
overall and unclosed Protocols piled up. The Court 
considers that appropriate measures ought to be taken to 
bring the situation under control and observe the time 
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amount of the financial package should be established on 
the basis of what the recipient countries can actually absorb 
during the period the Protocols apply. Moreover, a 
mechanism for closing the Protocols, leading in particular 
to a formal decision on how any sums left over are to be 
used (see paragraphs 3.1 — 3.22), should be created. 
6.3. Mention must be made of worrying weaknesses in 
the systems which the Commission has set up for the 
operations which it itself manages directly and for those 
which the EIB manages as the Commission's agent. 
6.4. The accounting systems, as they stand, are in-
adequate for the purpose of reliable and effective 
monitoring of the execution of the Protocols, and there is 
no system for monitoring the financial execution of the 
projects and measures (see paragraphs 4.2 — 4.11). 
6.5. In the case of those operations that are assigned to 
the EIB, the Commission loses control over the financing 
decisions even though such decisions commit budgetary 
resources. Having failed to ask for a minimum of suitable 
information to be provided on the implementation and the 
results of these operations, the Commission finds itself in a 
situation where it cannot possibly discharge its re-
sponsibilities as regards the execution of the budget. It is 
indispensable for the Commission to lay down, jointly with 
the EIB, appropriate procedures to provide it with the 
necessary information on the implementation and the 
results of the operations that are being financed (see 
paragraphs 4.12 — 4.23). 
6.6. The Commission's monitoring of those measures 
that it manages directly is all too often inadequate. The lack 
of an appropriate management system results in ill-defined 
and scattered responsibilities, a lack of clear instructions 
and a paucity of available information on the implemen-
tation of the projects and measures, and it also means that 
there is no evaluation of the effectiveness of Community 
aid. The slow rate of execution of the projects, combined 
with the mobility of the Commission staff and a workload 
which is beyond the abilities of the departments concerned, 
only aggravate matters. 
6.7. The Court considers it necessary for the requisite 
improvements to be made without delay. In the first place, 
there is need for complete, high-quality information from 
the recipients of Community aid. Guidelines should be 
issued so as to harmonize the organization and presen-
tation of the files on the implementation of the projects, 
and a system of regular monitoring should be instituted. 
Evaluations in the course and on completion of the 
execution of these projects ought to be carried out 
systematically so as to allow the effectiveness of Com-
munity aid to be measured, the necessary corrective 
measures to be adopted and lessons to be learned for the 
future. Such evaluations ought to be provided for in the 
financing agreements, so that the data needed for them can 
be established during the execution of the project (see 
paragraphs 4.24 — 4.43). 
6.8. The desirable rigour and realism are sometimes not 
in evidence when projects are being planned, so that their 
potential effectiveness is jeopardized from the outset by an 
unfavourable economic environment or the incompetence 
of the bodies responsible for their implementation, or else 
by financing plans which are either imprecise or incom-
plete. All too often, unrealistic timetables are laid down. 
The Court considers that very special care ought to go into 
the planning of projects. The constraints encountered in 
their implementation should not be ignored but should, on 
the contrary, be taken into account in laying down the 
objectives, means and schedules. The financing agreement 
should become a real reference for guiding the implemen-
tation and measuring the effectiveness of projects (see 
paragraphs 5.20 — 5.36). 
6.9. The implementation of projects is frequently affected 
by the cumbersomeness of the procedures, the weakness of 
the administrative structures in the recipient countries, the 
insufficiency of human or financial resources, failure by the 
recipients to abide by their undertakings, or even 
occasionally by the lack of any real motivation to see the 
projects completed. Substantial changes are sometimes 
made to the content or orientation of projects without 
adequate prior investigation. Sometimes, for diverse 
reasons, the actual contribution made by the technical 
assistance financed by the Community is very minor (see 
paragraphs 5.37 — 5.53). 
6.10. The effectiveness of Community aid varies con-
siderably from one country to another. It may be 
considered to be generally satisfactory in Jordan and 
Tunisia. The same is true in Malta, although, for the First 
Protocol, this still only involved financial participation in 
measures which were all but complete. In Morocco, the 
achievement of objectives has sometimes been delayed or 
jeopardized by failure to carry out the operations for which 
the Moroccan party is responsible. In Egypt, failure is all 
too often to be feared or a fact. The implementation of 
financial and technical cooperation with Algeria has until 
recently been hampered to the point that no results are to be 
expected from it at present. In the absence of the necessary 
information, the audit of records that the Court has carried 
out does not permit it to offer an opinion on the 
effectiveness of Community aid in Turkey (see paragraphs 
5.54 — 5.91). 
6.11. The renewed Mediterranean policy, which aims at a 
qualitative and quantitative leap forward in the Com-
munity's relations with Mediterranean non-member 
countries and the broad lines of which were defined by the 
Council in late 1990, implies in particular a substantial 
strengthening of the Community's financial cooperation. 
For the five-year period from 1992-1996, the total 
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within and outside the Protocols is around 1 300 Mio ECU. 
From this standpoint, it is all the more urgent that attention 
should be paid to the weaknesses highlighted by the Court 
and those improvements made that are necessary for more 
efficient and effective use of Community funds. 
6.12. Many of the observations which the Court has put 
forward in this report are not specific.to the management of 
financial and technical cooperation with Mediterranean 
non-member countries. In many respects, they overlap with 
the Court's previous analyses in the area of the manage-
ment of Community funds for development aid, whether 
aid to Mediterranean non-member countries, aid to the 
developing countries of Latin America and Asia or aid 
financed in the context of the EDFs. This highlights the 
urgent need, particularly for the Commission, to give 
careful consideration to these problems and to make the 
corrections which are needed to improve the management 
of development aid as a whole. 
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at the Court meeting of 
18 July 1991. 
For the Court of Auditors p.p. 
Aldo ANGIOI 
President 
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ANNEX 1 
Legal provisions governing the cooperation programmes with Mediterranean non-member countries 
Country 
TURKEY 
CYPRUS 
MALTA 
ALGERIA 
MOROCCO 
TUNISIA 
EGYPT 
JORDAN 
LEBANON 
SYRIA 
Protocol 
No 
3 
C
1) 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
Date 
signed 
12.05.77 
(
2) 
15.09.77 
20.12.83 
30.11.89 
4.03.76 
4.12.85 
20.03.89 
26.04.76 
28.10.82 
26.10.87 
27.04.76 
10.06.82 
26.05.88 
25.04.76 
28.10.82 
26.10.87 
18.01.77 
25.05.82 
26.10.87 
18.01.77 
10.06.82 
26.10.87 
3.05.77 
17.06.82 
2.12.87 
18.01.77 
10.06.82 
Period of 
application 
1979-31.10.1981 
1.07.1980-30.06.1982 
1.01.1979-31.12.1983 
1.05.1984-31.12.1988 
1.06.1990-31.12.1993 
1.11.1978-31.10.1983 
1.10.1986-31.10.1988 
1.08.1989-31.10.1993 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.01.1983-31.10.1986 
1.03.1988-31.10.1991 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.01.1983-31.10.1986 
1.11.1988-31.10.1991 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.06.1983-31.10.1986 
1.05.1988-31.10.1991 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.01.1983-31.10.1986 
1.08.1988-31.10.1991 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.01.1983-31.10.1986 
1.02.1988-31.10.1991 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.03.1983-31.10.1986 
1.03.1988-31.10.1991 
1.11.1978-31.10.1981 
1.02.1983-31.10.1986 
Duration 
2 years 10 months 
2 years 
5 years 
4 years 8 months 
3 years 7 months 
5 years 
2 years 1 months 
4 years 3 months 
3 years 
3 years 10 months 
3 years 8 months 
3 years 
3 years 10 months 
3 years 
3 years 
3 years 5 months 
3 years 6 months 
3 years 
3 years 10 months 
3 years 3 months 
3 years 
3 years 10 months 
3 years 9 months 
3 years 
3 years 9 months 
3 years 8 months 
3 years 
3 years 9 months 
Council Decision or Regulation 
No 
79/281 
2/80(
3) 
2760/78 
787/84 
90/153 
939/76 
2458/86 
89/378 
2210/78 
3177/82 
88/30 
2211/78 
3181/82 
88/453 
2212/78 
3183/82 
88/34 
2213/78 
3178/82 
88/31 
2215/78 
3179/82 
88/32 
2214/78 
3180/82 
88/33 
2216/78 
3182/82 
Date 
5.03.79 
19.09.80 
23.11.78 
26.03.84 
26.02.90 
23.04.76 
7.07.86 
12.06.89 
26.09.78 
22.11.82 
21.12.87 
26.09.78 
22.11.82 
30.06.88 
26.09.78 
22.11.82 
21.12.87 
26.09.78 
22.11.82 
21.12.87 
26.09.78 
22.11.82 
21.12.87 
26.09.78 
22.11.82 
21.12.87 
26.09.78 
22.11.82 
Published in the OJ 
L 67, 17.03.79 
not published 
L 332, 29.11.78 
L 85,28.03.84 
L 82, 29.03.90 
L 111, 28.04.76 
L216, 5.08.86 
L 180, 27.06.89 
L 263, 27.09.78 
L 337, 29.11.82 
L 22, 27.01.88 
L 264, 27.09.78 
L 337, 29.11.82 
L 224, 13.08.88 
L 265, 27.09.78 
L 337, 29.11.82 
L 22,27.01.88 
L 266, 27.09.78 
L 337, 29.11.82 
L 22,27.01.88 
L 268, 27.09.78 
L 337, 29.11.82 
L 22,27.01.88 
L 267, 27.09.78 
L 337, 29.11.82 
L 22,27.01.88 
L 269, 27.09.78 
L 337, 29.11.82 
(') Special aid. 
(
2) Not applicable. 
(
3) Decision of the EEC-Turkey Association. 26. 9. 91 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 252/43 
ANNEX 2 
The framework of financial and technical cooperation 
The Financial Protocols signed to date 
1. The Cooperation Agreements and the Protocols concluded by the Council with the countries concerned are 
based on Article 238 of the EEC Treaty. The references for the legislative provisions governing the programmes 
for cooperation with the ten countries discussed are listed in Annex 1. At the end of 1990, three series of 
Protocols had been signed (see Annex 1): 
a) with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries in 1976/77, 1982 and 1987/88; 
b) with Cyprus in 1977, 1983 and 1989; 
c) with Malta in 1976, 1985 and 1989; 
d) with Turkey in 1963, 1970 and 1977 (
J). 
As can be seen from Table 1, the overall amount of the aid granted from budgetary resources was 1 714,5 Mio 
ECU, of which 708 Mio ECU was for the Maghreb countries, 629 Mio ECU for the Mashreq countries and 
377,5 Mio ECU for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey (
2). Graphs 1 and 2 illustrate how the aid from budgetary 
resources is divided up between the geographical areas and recipient countries concerned. 
Period of application of the Financial Protocols 
2. The Financial Protocols are designed to cover a period of five years, during which the funds made available 
by the Community may be committed. In fact, as Annex 1 shows, if the date of entry into force and the specified 
expiry date of the Protocol are taken into account, the true period ofapplication varies between about two and 
four years (except for the First Financial Protocols with Cyprus and Malta). Nevertheless, on the analogy of the 
various Lome Conventions each of the Protocols has a provision to the effect that if uncommitted funds remain 
upon expiry of the period of application, these funds may be used until exhausted. 
Volume and forms of financial and technical cooperation 
3. The total amount fixed in the Protocols involves two very distinct financing instruments: 
a) loans granted by the EIB from its own resources; 
(
J) Only the Third Financial Protocol with Turkey and the special aid granted in 1980 are examined in this report, as the first 
two Financial Protocols did not make any calls on Community budgetary resources. 
(
2) The amounts include the 75 Mio ECU of special aid granted to Turkey in 1980. The aid is not covered by a financial 
protocol, but die implementing procedures are similar. No C 252/44  Official Journal of the European Communities  26. 9. 91 
b) financial operations which make use of the Community's budgetary resources and which can assume the 
various forms described in paragraph 4. 
4. As regards aid financed from budgetary resources, the Protocols distinguish between the following types of 
operation: 
a) loans on special terms (40-year duration, 10-year grace period, interest rate of 1 %), which make it possible 
to finance development projects where the rate of profitability is very low. This formula has been 
abandoned in the Third Protocols, except in the case of the Protocol with Turkey; 
b) non-repayable aid which can be used in several forms i
1): 
i) grants in the strict sense of the term, which make it possible to finance development projects which are 
not in themselves profitable, especially technical assistance projects; 
ii) interest-rate subsidies, which enable the EIB, to which they are paid, to reduce the interest rates on the 
loans which it grants from its own resources. In the case of the First Protocols, the rate of this subsidy is 
a uniform 2% ; in the case of the subsequent ones, the rate varies from one country to another, with 
some countries even opting to forgo it in order to be able to use all the non-repayable aid in the form of 
grants (see Table); 
Levels of interest-rate subsidies on loans granted from EIB 
own resources 
Country 
Cyprus 
Malta 
Algeria 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Egypt 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Financial Protocols 
First 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
Second 
2% 
none 
2% 
2% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
none 
3% 
Third 
1,5 % 
1,5 % 
none 
none 
2% 
2% 
2% 
none 
I
1) 
(!) As at 31 December 1989 a Third Financial Protocol with Syria had not 
been signed. 
c) contributions to the formation of risk capital. The First and Second Protocols allow such contributions, 
which are to be charged against the amounts of the loans on special terms, which may in particular take the 
form of subordinated loans, conditional loans or participations. The Third Protocols, save that with 
Turkey, reserve a specific allocation for operations of this kind. 
The total amount of 1 714,5 Mio ECU of overall aid financed from budgetary resources can be broken down 
into 536 Mio ECU of loans on special terms, 1 134 Mio ECU of non-repayable aid and 44,5 Mio ECU of 
contributions to risk-capital formation (see Table 1 and Graph 3). 
5. Except for certain restrictions laid down in the First Protocols, the financing instruments described in 
paragraphs 3 and 4 may be used jointly to finance the same investment project. 
(
2) The Third Financial Protocol with Turkey is an exception in that it only includes loans on special terms. A grant of aid, in 
the form of subsidies, was made available to this country by way of the special aid introduced by Decision No 2/80 of the 
EEC-Turkey Association Council of 19 September 1980 (see Table 1). 26. 9. 91 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 252/45 
6. Although it is not strictly speaking a financing instrument, mention should be made of the existence of a 
globalized Community guarantee, which is entered for the record in the general budget and applies to loans 
granted by the EIB from its own resources to a group of Mediterranean countries, including those which are the 
subject of this report (
J). For all the countries discussed in this report, this global guarantee is to cover 75% of 
the total amount of loans granted by the EIB. The guarantee has been invoked on several occasions since 1988 
(see paragraph 5.11 of the report). 
General objectives and field of application of the aid 
7. The general objectives contained in the Protocols - those of contributing to the economic and social 
development of the recipient country — are supplemented by definitions of the field of application of the aid. 
8. The First and Second Protocols with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries and with Cyprus and Malta 
provide mainly that the Community aid is to be used for helping to finance: 
a) investment projects in the fields of production and economic infrastructure, the aims being to diversify the 
economic structure of the countries in question and, in particular, to promote their industrialization and 
the modernization of their agricultural sector; 
b) technical cooperation as a preparation for or a supplement to investment projects, and technical 
cooperation measures in the field of training. 
9. The Third Protocols with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries give priority to the financing of projects or 
cooperation measures relating to: 
a) the development and diversification of agricultural production with a view to reducing these countries' 
dependence on imports of food, and the diversification of agricultural production and exports; 
b) the development of cooperation in the fields of industry, training and research, technology, trade and other 
services; 
c) regional and multilateral cooperation. 
10. For their part, the Third Protocols with Malta and Cyprus confine the field of application of the aid to the 
measures referred to in paragraph 9(b). All these Third Protocols, unlike their predecessors, specify for each of 
the main areas in question the kind of projects and measures likely to be financed as a matter of priority. 
11. The financial aid granted under the Third Protocol with Turkey aims to strengthen trade and economic 
relations between the parties. Financing is granted to investment projects which help to boost the productivity 
of the Turkish economy and which aim, in particular, to give Turkey a higher-yielding agriculture and 
industrial undertakings or services that are modern and operated rationally. 
12. Decision No 1/80 of 19 September 1980 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council, the aim of which is to 
give new impetus to the Association Agreement, authorizes the financing of investment projects, in particular in 
the fields of industry, energy, agriculture and training, and technical cooperation projects which are 
preparatory or complementary to these projects. It is in this context that the special aid granted by Decision No 
2/80 of this same EEC-Turkey Association Council should be looked at in particular. 
f
1) A Council decision of 8.3.1977 was the origin of a contract of guarantee signed in 1978 at the time of the First Financial 
Protocols by the Community, represented by the Commission and the EIB. A document extending that guarantee contract 
has been drawn up for each new Financial Protocol. No C 252/46  Official Journal of the European Communities  26. 9. 91 
Implementing mechanism 
Budgetary basis 
13. Up until the end of 1990, Chapter 96 of Title B9 of the general budget provided the support structure for 
the commitment and payment appropriations required for financing financial and technical cooperation in 
these countries. The appropriations relating to cooperation with Turkey, Cyprus and Malta come under 
separate articles, whereas those relating to the Protocols with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries, designated 
by the term 'southern Mediterranean countries' have been pooled since 1987 under one article (965), which has 
two items, one (9650) for the First and Second Protocols and the other (9651) for the Third Protocols. 
Implementing sub-headings offer the Commission the possibility of monitoring the budgetary operations by 
country and by Protocol. 
Provisions for the application of the Financial Protocols 
14. The procedures and responsibilities relating to the fixing of the specific objectives of the cooperation 
programmme, the appraisal of projects and the execution, management and maintenance of the projects 
financed are all set out in the Protocols themselves. The Protocols also lay down the rules for participating in 
invitations to tender and the rules governing contracts, as well as the tax arrangements applicable to the latter. 
15. The Protocols say nothing about the Community's internal procedures for deciding and managing the aid 
and relating, in particular, to the division of responsibilities between the EIB and the Commission (
J) and to the 
procedures for directing, examining and approving the flows of aid. These management rules have to be laid 
down in an implementing regulation. 
16. In March 1977, and in February and March 1978, the Commission submitted to the Council proposals for 
a regulation on the application of the provisions of the First Protocols. Differences of opinion on the respective 
powers of the Commission and the committees made up of the permanent representatives of the Member State 
governments prevented any progress. 
17. An ad hoc procedure was then set up in December 1978, which applied until the entry into force on 1 
January 1987 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3973/86 (
2), which determined the provisions for applying the 
Protocols with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries and with Cyprus and Malta. The Commission, following a 
decision taken on 22 January 1986 (
3), has since that date been applying this Regulation by analogy in respect of 
projects financed in Turkey. 
Planning 
18. Planning missions are carried out jointly by the Commission and the EIB in each recipient country in order 
to identify and select projects which could be eligible for financing. These missions give rise to reports, which 
specify the amounts of aid reserved for each economic sector and the type of financing proposed. These reports 
are then submitted to the Council's 'Mediterranean* group, which holds an exchange of views for the purpose of 
examining the sectoral angles of the planned cooperation measure. 
(
1) This does not apply to the Third Financial Protocols with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries and with Malta and Cyprus 
as they contain provisions to the same effect. 
(
2) OJ No L 370, 30.12. 1986, p. 5. 
(
3) Minutes COM(86) PV 811, 24.1.1986. 26. 9. 91 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 252/47 
Divisions of competences for the management of the aid 
Projects entrusted to the EIB 
19. A large part of the operations financed from budgetary resources is managed by the EIB. On 21 November 
1978, taking as its basis the proposal for an implementing regulation referred to in paragraph 16, the 
Commission made two agreements with the EIB (one for the Maghreb and Mashreq countries and one for five 
other countries, including Turkey, Cyprus and Malta) under which it entrusted to the latter the management of 
the following operations: 
a) interest-rate subsidies on loans granted by the EIB from its own resources; 
b) risk-capital operations; 
c) loans on special terms in the sectors of industry, energy, mining, tourism and economic infrastructure in the 
Maghreb and Mashreq countries, and all the loans on special terms for the other countries (broad 
mandate); 
d) loans on special terms managed by the Commission (restricted mandate). 
20. By an exchange of letters dated 22 December 1982 and 6 January 1983, the EIB and the Commission 
agreed to extend this agreement to the implementation of the Second Protocols with the Maghreb and Mashreq 
countries. 
21. On 16 June 1987, another agreement of the same type was signed, this time relating to Regulation (EEC) 
No 3973/86; under this agreement the EIB received a general mandate to manage: 
a) interest-rate subsidies on loans granted by the EIB from its own resources; and 
b) risk-capital operations, 
within the framework of the Third Protocols, still to be signed at that time (see Annex 1), with the Maghreb and 
Mashreq countries. 
22. By an exchange of letters in November 1989, the EIB and the Commission agreed to extend this agreement 
to the protocols signed subsequently with Cyprus and Malta. 
23. Under the broad mandate, the Commission entrusted the EIB with: 
a) preparing, negotiating and signing the loan contract on behalf of the Community; 
b) the lodging of securities and the organization of preferential rights in favour of the Community; 
c) the disbursement of the loan; 
d) the collection of the interest and the recovery of the principal. 
24. Under the restricted mandate, the Community entrusted the EIB with: 
a) collaborating in drawing up the draft loan contract between the Commission and the borrower; 
b) drawing up documents which specify the detailed rules for monitoring the interest and the repayment of the 
principal; 
c) lodging securities and organizing preferential rights in favour of the Community; 
d) collecting interest and receiving the repayment of the principal. No C 252/48  Official Journal of the European Communities  26. 9. 91 
Projects managed by the Commission 
25. The Commission remains directly responsible for managing: 
a) subsidies; 
b) loans on special terms intended to finance projects in the Maghreb and Mashreq countries in sectors other 
than those specified in paragraph 19(c). 
Procedures for making financing decisions 
26. Under the ad hoc procedure which existed prior to the adoption of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3973/86 
(see paragraph 17), projects which received a unanimous favourable opinion from an ad hoc Council working 
party were adopted by the Council. 
27. Since the adoption of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3973/86, the decision-making procedures are: 
a) by the 'Article 6 Committee' at the Commission: this Committee, which includes a representative of the 
E1B, gives its opinion, by a qualified majority, on the financing proposals submitted to it by the 
Commission. The Commission then takes the financing decisions; 
b) by the 'Article 9 Committee' at the EIB: this Committee, which includes a representative of the 
Commission, gives its opinion, by a qualified majority, on the draft financing decisions drawn up by the 
EIB under its general mandate. The Commission is also required to state its position on the draft decisions, 
except for applications for loans with interest-rate subsidies (
l). The EIB's Board of Directors then takes 
the financing decisions in accordance with the provisions of its own founding instrument. 
28. In the absence of a favourable opinion from these committees (and/or from the Commission in the case of 
the Article 9 Committee), the texts provide for or authorize the matter to be brought before the Council, which 
takes its decisions by a qualified majority. 
Financing agreements and loan agreements 
Projects entrusted to the EIB 
29. On the basis of the decision of the EIB's Board of Directors to grant financing to a particular project, the 
Commission commits the necessary appropriations. The EIB then signs the loan agreement with the borrower. 
This differs from the EDF procedure, whereby the loan agreement is signed by the Commission. 
Projects administered by the Commission 
30. The Commission adopts a financing decision, commits the appropriations and then enters into a financing 
agreement with the government of the recipient State. If the financing is in the form of a loan on special 
conditions, a financing agreement is also signed with the borrower. If the latter is not the State itself, a contract 
of guarantee is also made with the government of this State, which undertakes to assume the borrower's 
financial and pecuniary obligations in the event of his default. 
(') Regulation (EEC) No 3973/86 does not mention the possibility of a Commission opinion concerning a subsidized loan. 26. 9. 91  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 252/49 
Administrative methods used 
Methods peculiar to the Commission 
31. The Commission, as chief authorizing officer, implements the financing decisions and is responsible for 
administering the resources. Several Commission departments are involved. The administrative channels vary 
according to the management tasks (selection of projects, drawing-up of financing decisions and agreements, 
technical opinions, monitoring of projects carried out, internal control and payment of amounts due) and 
involve the various geographical desks at the Directorate-General for External Relations (DC I), the technical 
departments and the financial departments of the Directorate-General for Development (DG VIII), financial 
control (DG XX) and the paying and accounting departments of the Directorate-General for Budgets (DG 
XIX). 
32. Where one exists (*), the Commission delegation in the recipient country ensures that the financial and 
technical management of the projects is sound. In particular, it is responsible for taking part in drawing up and 
issuing the invitations to tender and examining the tenders; it puts its stamps of approval on the payment orders 
that are issued by the national authorizing officer (see paragraph 33) and forwarded to the Commission for 
clearance. 
Methods peculiar to the recipient states 
33. The recipient state's government is represented by a national authorizing officer, who is responsible for 
carrying out the project. In this capacity, this body issues invitations to tender, receives the tenders, directs the 
work of examining them and draws up the result of the invitations to tender; it indicates its agreement with the 
contracts made by the project's prime contractor and informs the Commission of them; as part of the process of 
commitment of appropriations drawn up by the Commission, it validates and authorizes the expenditure. The 
national authorizing officer may delegate all or some of its responsibilities to a national body, generally the one 
directly entrusted with implementing the project. 
34. The paying agent is responsible for making authorized payments in the currency of the recipient state. It is 
a financial institution selected by mutual agreement by the Commission and the government of the state, and is 
usually the Central Bank of the country in question. 
35. The paying agent maintains in its books an account, denominated in the currency of one of the Member 
States, which is topped up, as needed, by the Commission. An agreement signed by the Commission and the 
paying agent specifies the rules for operating this account and the nature of the responsibilities conferred upon 
the paying agent. 
(*) It is expected that delegations will be opened in Cyprus and Malta in 1991. No C 252/50  Official Journal of the European Communities  26. 9. 91 
THE COMMISSION'S REPLIES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.2. The Court's comments will be taken into account 
both in drawing up the new Protocols and in assessing 
cooperation with the Mediterranean countries under the 
new Mediterranean policy. 
3. THE SYSTEM OF PROTOCOLS 
The consequences 
3.6 - 3.7. The Commission is aware of the problems in 
the past but would point out to the Court that there has 
been no delay in implementing the preparatory measures 
for the Fourth Financial Protocols. Indeed, the Commission 
introduced the basic texts on financial and technical 
cooperation at the very beginning of 1991. 
Budgetary management 
Spreading-out of commitments 
3.8 - 3.12. The purpose of evenly spreading out commit-
ments is to facilitate budgetary management and the 
financial protocols are both realistic and flexible enough to 
achieve this. Because of this, the provision referred to 
should not cause any problems in future protocols. 
However, the Commission is prepared to consider any 
scheme that will improve the planning of commitments. 
Utilization of the balance 
3.13 — 3.15. Given that recipient countries may en-
counter political and institutional difficulties in utilizing all 
the funds provided for in the financial protocols within the 
time limits, imposing more restrictive provisions might not 
be easy. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that 
although the uncommitted amounts at the end of the period 
covered by the financial protocols are well-defined, this is 
not the case with any balances left over from projects which 
have already been financed. 
Solutions to such problems must be agreed with the partner 
during the life of the financial protocol in order to arrive at 
a reasonable timetable for utilizing all outstanding 
balances. 
In any event, the Commission has recently proposed to all 
national authorizing officers that they: 
— carry over all commitments not allocated under 
previous protocols to the Fourth Financial Protocols, 
within a programming framework common to all funds 
available for commitment; 
— wind up all projects under the Second Financial 
Protocols, to the extent that this is possible. 
Allocation of grant aid 
3.16 - 3.18. The Commission will look into the methods 
used in financial cooperation to ensure greater trans-
parency in the utilization of budgetary resources. 
The consequences as regards implementation 
3.19 - 3.20. See reply to points 3.13-3.15. 
Implementing Financial Regulation 
3.21 - 3.22. The Court has a good point. A proposal for a 
regulation relating to the implementation of the financial 
protocols was transmitted by the Commission to the 
Council at the end of May 1991. The regulation should 
ensure that the Fourth Financial Protocols are covered. 26. 9. 91  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 252/51 
Observations on the system of protocols  The measures entrusted to the EIB 
3.23 - 3.31. Even if the protocol system has a number of 
disadvantages, it also has some advantages, not the least of 
which is the scope for multiannual cooperation adapted to 
the specific circumstances of the countries concerned. The 
Commission is continually assessing the systems and 
procedures currently in force and considers that the 
protocol system could be strengthened and improved. 
When new protocols are drawn up, therefore, the 
Commission will certainly take the Court's suggestions 
into account. 
At a more general level, the Commission will be reviewing 
its cooperation policy as the single market approaches and 
will be considering whether it would be better to continue 
with the present system or to modify it. 
Legal basis of the EIB mandates 
4.13-4.14. The Commission agrees with the Court 
about the provisions of Regulations No 3973/86 as they 
relate to the EIB; this whole area has now been thoroughly 
reviewed and the new Financial Regulation (currently in 
draft form) makes the Commission solely responsible for 
implementing the budget. The Commission would point 
out that although in the past the application of Regulation 
No 3973/86 represented the law in force, which was 
faithfully carried out by the Commission, the amended 
Regulation should ensure that budgetary orthodoxy is once 
again fully respected. The situation described by the Court 
should not, therefore, reoccur. 
4. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
The accounting systems 
The Commission would point out that the principle of 
conferring upon the EIB the management of Community-
financed measures has not been called into question, 
although the rules for giving such a mandate do require 
altering. 
Monitoring the implementation of the financial 
protocols 
4.2 - 4.5. SINCOM and the improvements to the auxi-
liary accounting system (FINPICS) should improve 
financial control of the projects and their components. 
The Commission s role 
4.15-4.23. The Commission accepts that it only has 
limited information about the EIB's activities, although the 
Bank has always respected its obligations whenever it has 
been asked for information. 
The Commission will ensure that the financial implemen-
tation of a protocol is closely monitored and constantly 
updated. 
As regards financial cooperation under the new Mediter-
ranean policy, the Commission is looking into ways of 
improving the rules governing its relations with the EIB. 
Financial monitoring of the projects 
4.6 — 4.11. The Commission is in broad agreement with 
the Court's comments. It is looking into ways of improving 
procedures and the accounting system. The Commission 
has noted the Court's recommendation that priority should 
be given to setting up a harmonized system for monitoring 
'primary' and 'secondary' commitments. The 'commit-
ments under financing agreements' referred to in Ar-
ticle 106(2) of the Financial Regulation and the 'individual 
commitments' referred to in Article 109(3), which broadly 
correspond to 'primary' and 'secondary' commitments, 
will be gradually incorporated into the Commission's 
project accounting. 
Measures managed by the Commission 
The aid management system 
4.24 — 4.27. The Commission is studying how to set up a 
harmonized management system to be followed both by the 
central departments and by the delegations. No C 252/52  Official Journal of the European Communities  26. 9. 91 
The sharing of responsibilities 
4.28-4.29. The Commission departments are looking 
into ways of ensuring a clearer division of tasks that is 
better adapted to the requirements of the financial 
protocols. 
Instructions 
4.30-4.33. The Commission will try to ensure, to the 
extent that its resources permit, that harmonized and 
transparent monitoring is provided both centrally and in 
the delegations. 
Work programmes and implementation reports 
4.34-4.38. Although the Commission agrees with the 
Court that recipients should fulfil their obligations, in 
practice the Commission is often faced with sensitive 
situations which call for flexible management and where 
the legal provisions of the Protocol must be interpreted in 
the light of the actual conditions in which the projects are 
implemented. 
However, the Commission will not hesitate, whether at the 
planning or the implementation stage, to take any 
appropriate and realistic measure to ensure that recipients 
meet their obligations. 
Staff resources 
4.40 — 4.41. The Court's observations concerning staff 
resources are correct. Some of the shortcomings noted by 
the Court are a direct effect of staff shortages. 
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND THE RESULTS 
OF FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL 
COOPERATION 
Project conception 
5.20-5.36. The Commission agrees with the Court's 
comments. It shares the Court's opinion that the financing 
agreement should be used as the reference document for 
project implementation and evaluation. 
The Commission will take steps to ensure that this 
document is drawn up in the proper manner. It should be 
noted that the Commission has included a deadline for 
implementation in the financial agreements since 1988. 
However, the management of its partners cannot always be 
relied upon, with the result that the initial timetable 
sometimes needs adjusting. 
Execution of projects 
Delays 
5.37-5.38. It is the Commission's opinion that the 
conception of projects in the countries studied by the Court 
should be based on a realistic analysis of all the components 
which might have an impact on their execution. On the 
other hand, no ex-ante evaluation can ever take into 
account all the obstacles and constraints that a project 
might encounter. 
Major project modifications 
5.39-5.43. The Commission agrees with the Court's 
observations. The Commission's departments and deleg-
ations will have to improve their monitoring of activities 
receiving Community funds. 
Technical assistance 
5.44 — 5.48. The Commission believes that, by and large, 
the quality of the benefits provided by technical assistance 
is acceptable, as are relations between the experts 
themselves and the local institutions concerned. 
Recipients' commitments 
5.49 - 5.53. The Court's observations are relevant. There 
are many elements over which Commission departments 
and delegations have no direct control and over which they 
can exert only limited influence. 
Effectiveness of projects 
Turkey 
5.55. While agreeing that the Court is justified in its 
comments, the Commission does not accept that in the case 
of two projects the development objective was disregarded. 
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specific measures with a short-term multiplier effect that 
would help eliminate bottlenecks in the economy. 
Algeria 
5.57 - 5.61. The Court's observations are mostly correct. 
Until recently, the Algerian authorities evinced little 
interest in cooperating with the Community. Under its new 
economic policy, Algeria appears to be opening up to the 
outside world. This reorientation of economic policy 
means that some training programmes will need reviewing 
and the Commission has already requested that some 
projects be closed down or modified. 
Morocco 
5.62 - 5.69. The lack of monitoring by the Commission is 
partly due to the insufficiency of human resources. As 
regards the Sale slum-clearance project, in view of the delay 
in providing socio-administrative facilities, the Commis-
sion is awaiting a detailed assessment of current activities 
before giving its reply to a Moroccan request that the 
balance should be used for extending the project. 
Although it accepts the Court's comments on the Haouz 
Central development project and the Ait Chouarit dam 
project, the Commission would point out that the 
Community's contribution is a relatively small proportion 
of the whole and so it is difficult for the Commission to 
exercise overall control. 
Egypt 
5.77 - 5.85. Most of the Court's observations do not call 
for any comment. Cooperation with Egypt is a complex 
business and institutional weaknesses mean that very close 
monitoring is required. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
6.2. The Commission is aware that the implementation 
of financial and technical cooperation with non-member 
Mediterranean countries has not proceeded without 
difficulties. Administrative, institutional or political 
factors can in some cases prevent funds from being used 
within the deadlines. However, the Commission is trying to 
observe more strictly the time framework laid down for the 
operations it funds and since 1988 the financing agreements 
have specified the likely duration of each project. Although 
a formal mechanism for closing the protocols does not 
appear appropriate, the Commission has proposed to its 
partners that any sums left over from previous protocols 
should be carried over to future protocols so that they can 
be programmed jointly. 
6.3 - 6.8. For the most part, the Commission shares the 
Court's concerns. Improvements to procedures and to the 
accounting system are planned. 
As regards operations assigned to the EIB, the Commission 
is reviewing, under the new Mediterranean policy, the 
possibility of improving all the rules applicable to its 
relations with the EIB. 
Furthermore, the Commission broadly agrees with the 
Court's remarks concerning the monitoring of the 
measures funded; it is looking into ways of improving 
monitoring by setting up a management system that can be 
used both by the delegations and by headquarters. 
However, most of the imperfections noted by the Court can 
be put down to staff shortages both in the delegations and 
at headquarters. 
The Commission would point out that according to a 
statement in the Council minutes annexed to Council 
Regulation No 3973/86 of 22.12.1986 evaluations are 
required for all operations of more than ECU 5 million. 
The Commission agrees with the Court that the financing 
agreement should be the reference document for assessing 
the implementation of Community-financed projects. 
6.9. The Court's observations on the weakness of the 
administrative structures and the inadequacy of human 
resources in non-member countries have overall relevance. 
Under the new Mediterranean policy, the Commission 
intends to assist the countries in question to strengthen 
their institutions and to develop their human resources. As 
regards Community-financed technical assistance, the 
Court's criticisms apply only to certain specific cases. 
6.10. The Commission agrees with the Court that the 
effectiveness of Community aid varies for different reasons 
from one country to another. 